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1. SUMMARY: Appellant claims that CAS erred in declaring 
the escheat provisions of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25 
u.s.c. §2206, unconstitutional as a taking without just compensa-
tion. 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Appellees are members of 
the Oglala Sioux Tribe who would have obtained by will or intes-




tion of section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25 
u.s.c. §2206. Enacted to address the increasing fractionization 
of Indian allotment land, section 207 prevents the descent of 
interests in an allotment that are "so small as to be financially 
meaningless": 
No undivided interest in any tract of trust or restricted 
land within a tribe's reservation or otherwise subject to 
a tribe's jurisdiction shall descendent [sic- probably 
should be "descend"] by intestacy or devise but shall 
escheat to that tribe if such interest represents 2 per 
centum or less of the total acreage in such tract and has 
earned to its owner less than $100 in the preceding year 
before it is due to escheat. 
25 u.s.c. §2206. (The statute was amended in 1984; see infra 
page 3). Appellees brought suit in district court (WD SD, Bogue, 
CJ) , seeking an injunction and a declaration that section 207 was 
unconstitutional as authorizing seizure of property without the 
just compensation required by the Fifth Amendment. The court 
found section 207 constitutio~ecause it affected only an expec-
tancy of heirship and not a vested property interest. 
CAS reversed. The court agreed that appellees had no vested 
property interest in the land. Appellees' decedents, however, 
had a vested property right in the property including the right 
to dispose with their property at death. Appellees had standing 
to assert the rights of their decedents who were, of course, 
unable to assert their rights themselves. The decedents rights 
derived from the original allotment statute, the Act of March 2, 
1889, ch. 405, §16, 25 Stat. 888, 893. The statute was in the 
nature of a bargain: each Indian allottee gained vested rights 
through the Act in exchange for a release of individuals' claims 
to tribal lands. The vested rights acquired included the power 
/ 
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to pass the lands upon death. "The individual Sioux thus had 
'enforceable expectations' that that power was part of the rights 
they received in return for relinquishment of their claims to 
former tribal lands." Juris. Stat. at 16a. By its terms, sec-
tion 207 does not provide for compensation. The statute, there-
fore, violated the just compensation clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. 
The court went on to hold that new section 207, amended 
after the initiation of the litigation, also was unconstitutional 
"insofar as the new provision preserves the language of the old." 
Juris. Stat. at 17a. The new statute provides: [I have itali-
cized the 1984 changes] 
(a) No undivided interest in any tract of trust or re-
stricted land within a tribe's reservation or otherwise 
subject to a tribe's jurisdiction shall descend by intes-
tacy or devise but shalll escheat to that tribe if such 
interest represents 2 per centum or less of the total 
acreage in such trach and is incapable of earning $100 in 
any one of the five years from the decedent's death. 
Where the fractional interest has earned to its owner 
less than $100 1n any one of the f1ve years before the 
decedent's death, there shall be a rebuttable resum tion 
that such 1nterest 1s 1ncapab e of earn1ng 00 1n any 
one of the five years following the death of the dece-
dent. 
(b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the devise of 
such an escheatable fractional interest to any other own-
er of an undivided fractional interest in such parcel or 
tract of trust or restricted land. 
(c) Notwithstanding the ~revisions of subsection (a), 
any Indian tribe may, subJect to the approval of the Sec-
retary, adopt its own code of laws to govern the disposi-
tion of interests that are escheatable under this sec-
tlon, and such codes or laws shall take precedence over 
the escheat provisions of subsection (a), provided, the 
Secretary shall not approve any code or law that fails to 
accom~lish the purpose of preventing further descent or 
fract1onation of such escheatable interests. 
Pub. L. No. 98-608,§1, 98 Stat.3173. 
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3. CONTENTIONS: Appellant contends that section 207 is a 
carefully tailored measure that falls well within whatever limits 
the Fifth Amendment might be thought to impose on such a regula-
tory statute to ensure that it is not an unconstitutional taking. 
The seven factors that appellant lists to support this conclusion 
can be distilled into two central points. First, section 207 
does not affect any substantial property interests: it only ap-
plies to de minimus undivided fractions of the allotment; it only 
affects the owner's ability to dispose of the property at death; 
it is unlikely to undermine investment-backed expectations. Sec-
ond, section 207 does not arbitrarily expropriate property for 
government use but instead effects an equitable solution to the 
uneconomical fractionization of Indian land: by escheat the land 
passes to the Indian tribe, not to the government; to the extent 
potential heirs or devisess retain a nexus with the tribe, they 
stand to benefit in some way by the operation of the provision. 
CAB erred in finding that the Sioux allotment statute was a 
kind of contract in which Congress conferred on individual allot-
tees and every succeeding generation of their descendants a per-
manent and vested right to be exempt from whatever amendments 
Congress might adopt to govern the distribution of a decedent's 
property. 
Appellant also challenges CAB's holding that the amended 
section 207 is unconstitutional. None of the interest of the 
decedents in this case are affected by the amended statute. "Be-
cause there was no case or controversy regarding the application 
of the amended Section 207 to the parties before the court of 
_ __,; 
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appeals, that court had no authority to invalidate that provi-
sion." Juris. Stat. at 25. 
Finally, appellant notes that the issue is substantial. 
4,430 property interests escheated to the tribes concerned during 
the period that the original version of Section 207 was in ef-
feet. Moreover, in light of CAS's invalidation of the amended 
statute, appellant has ordered that no final distribution be made 
of allotment property probate proceedings in the Eighth Circuit 
pending this Court's decision, "and a cloud has been cast over 
probate proceedings elsewhere as well." Juris. Stat. at 26 (cit-
ing a case filed in Idaho) .1 
Appellees contend that CAS's decision was correct in light 
of Choate v. Trapp, 224 u.s. 665 (1912). In Choate, the allotment 
act provided that each tribal member was to receive an allotment 
which was to be non-taxable for a limited period of time. This 
Court held that the allottees, individual owners of nontaxable 
land, possessed a vested right to the tax exemption and Congress 
had no power to remove the exemption without compensation. Here, 
the original allottees possessed a vested right to pass property 
acquired by allotment upon death. Appellee's argument that the 
property right involved is de minimus was rejected by the Choate 
Court: 
lAppellant agrees with the court of appeals that compensation 
is not available from the United States for any taking that might 
have occurred. Section 207 does not provide for compensation, 
and, in light of its legislative history, "we do not believe that 
Congress intended that compensation nevertheless be available in 
a suit against the United States under the Tucker Act." Juris. 
Stat. at 22, n.5. Cf. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 s.ct. 2S62 
(19S4). 
- 6 -
Under the provisions of the Fifth Amendment there was no 
power to deprive him of the exemption than other rights 
in property. No statute would have been valid which re-
duced his fee to a life estate or attempted to take from 
him ten acres, or fifty acres, or the timber growing on 
the land •••• It is conceded that no right which was ac-
tually conferred upon the Indian can be arbitrarily abro-
gated by statute. 
224 u.s., at 674. Appellants' argument that the escheat to the 
tribe somehow saves the statute ignores the distinction between 
an individual Indian's property and tribal property. Again, as 
this Court stated in Choate, "there was no indication that the 
power of wardship conferred authority on Congress to lessen any 
of the rights of property which have been vested in the individ-
ual Indian by prior laws or contracts." 224 u.s., at 67B. 
4. DISCUSSION: Jurisdiction is proper and the federal ques-
tions presented appear substantial. CAB's invalidation of the 
original statute, appellant claims, affects over four thousand 
escheated property interests. Each interest, however, is small -
- property that has not produced $100 in income in the past year. 
CAB's invalidation of the amended statute, however, will affect 
thousands more in years to come. 
On the merits, CAB's decision to invalidate the amended 
statute appears improper. First, as noted above, the 19B4 amend-
ments substantially refine the method by which an escheatable 
interest is determined. CAB, however, did not discuss any of the 
new provisions. Second, none of the appellees challenged the 
amended statute; moreover, since the new statute did not affect 
any of their interests, they had no standing to challenge its 
constitutionality. Finally, appellees in their motion to affirm 
- 7 -
do not mention, much less attempt to support, CAS's invalidation 
of the amended statute. 
The validity of the old statute is a close call. Appellant 
seems to claim that the original act did not give Indians the 
property right asserted in this case because the grant "to his 
heirs according to the laws of the State or Territory" only gave 
Indians the right to pass their land through intestacy. In 1910 
Congress gave Indians the right to dispose of property by will. 
The original "bargain," one could argue, did not give to Indians 
the right which they know claim is taken. Thus, Congress, like 
any state, is free to exercise the power, "which every state and 
sovereignty possesses, of regulating the manner and term upon 
which property real or personal within its dominion may be trans-
mitted by last will and testament, or by inheritance." Mager v. 
Grima, 49 u.s. 490 (1950). On the other hand, CAS's conclusion 
that such language was intended to give Indians the whole bundle 
of rights associated with property ownership is supported by the 
notion that "statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indians 
tribes are to be liberally construed, with doubtful expressions 
being resolved in favor of the Indians." Three Affiliated Tribes 
v. Wold Engineering, 104 S.Ct. 2267, 2275 (19S4). If the origi-
nal allotment did grant Indians these property rights, Choate 
would support CAS's holding that Congress cannot exercise its 
sovereign power without just compensation. If the Indians were 
granted a complete fee in the original allotment, the resolution 
of the case would depend on a standard, if perhaps difficult, 
application of takings clause analysis. 
- 8 -
The case falls within this Court's appellate jurisdiction 
and the federal questions presented are substantial. According-
ly, I recommend that the Court note probable jurisdiction. 
There is a response and a motion for leave to file an amicus 
brief and the brief itself by the Yakima Indian Nation. 
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No. 85-637, Hodel, Secretary of the Interior v. Irving, et al. 
(CA 8) 
Memorandum to File 
This is another litigation over Indian property rights. 
At issue is the constitutionality of § 207 of the Indian Land 
Consolidation Act of 1983, that became effective on January 12, 
1983. It provides that certain de minimis undivided fractional 
interests held by individual Indians in trust or restricted 
allotments shall not descend~testacy or devise, but shall 
escheat to the tribe. 
~ 
Over the years, going back to 1887, various statutes have 
authorized the allotment of land on reservations to individual 
Indians. In order to protect the allottees against the unwise 
alienation of their land, § 5 of the General Allotment Act 
provided that an allotted parcel was to be held in trust by the 
United States for a period of 25 years or for such further 
period as the President might prescribe. The allotment policy 
untimately was rejected by Congress in 1934, and further 
allotments were prohibited. Subsequently, Congress extended 
indefinitely the trust or restricted period of the then existing 
allotments. Section 5 of the General Allotment Act provided 
No. 85-637 2. 
that, upon the death of the original allottee, the land would 
continue to be held in trust for "his heirs according to the 
laws of the state or territory where the land is located." 
According to the SG's brief (p. 4), the statutory provision 
had the effect of preempting the inherent right of an Indian 
tribe to regulate the descent and distribution of the property 
of its members. 
Apparently with the passage of time, the heirs or devisees 
of allotted land received undivided fractional interests in 
allotments. Each such fractional interest often was further 
subdivided upon the death of the heir or devisee who owned it. 
After several generations, as the SG puts it, "ownership of 
individual allotments often became extremely fragmented." 
The consequences of the fractionated land ownership are 
set forth in the Senate Report on the amendment of 1984, and 
also are stated on p. 8 of the SG's brief. There is no 
question that the fractionated allotments caused serious 
problems when an Indian died leaving a will or intestate. 
To deal with this problem, § 207 of the Act of 1983 -
as originally enacted, provided that an undivided interest 
in trust or restricted land within a tribe's reservation, or 
subject to its jurisdiction, that represents two per cent or 
less of the total acreage of the tract, and has earned its owner 
No. 85-637 3. 
less than $100.00 in the preceding year, shall not descend 
by intestacy or devise. Rather, such fractional interests 
shall escheat to the Indian tribe. 
Appellees, potential heirs or devisees of parents who 
had died possessed of interests in allotted land, filed this 
suit on October 20, 1983 in U.S. District Court. They challenged 
the constitutionality of § 207 on the ground that it resulted in 
a taking of property without just compensation. The decedents 
of appellees all had died subsequently to the effective date of 
§ 207 (January 12, 1983) and either in March or April of that 
year. The district court found no violation of the Fifth 
Amendment. It reasoned that the rights of succession to the 
property of a deceased, whether by will or by intestacy, are 
created by statute; that nothing in the Constitution prohibits 
a legislature from limiting, conditioning, or even abolishing 
the power of testimentary disposition. The CA reversed, holding 
that § 207 as enacted in 1983 was invalid, and further that 
the amendment adopted in 1984 also was invalid. It acknowledged 
that Congress may alter the rights to property that have not yet 
vested an individual Indian, and also CA 8 recognized that the 
interference with any expectation of heirship did not result in 
the taking of vested property interest . The CA nevertheless 
held that § 207 does interfer~unlawfully with a vested right in 
No. 85-637 4. 
the original allottee and his successors to pass the lands 
upon death. The CA concluded that the effect of § 207 was 
to "reduce the ownership interests of the allottees from 
fees to life estates, a diminution which the Supreme Court 
suggested in Dicta would constitute a taking without compensation 
~ 
in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 
665, 674 (1912). 
Rather than prolong this memo (dictated to refresh my memory 
generally), I refer to the SG's summary of argument (pp. 17-22 
of his brief) for an excellent statement of the Government's posi-
tion. In brief summary, the SG first acknowledges that the 
authority of Congress over the property of individual Indians 
is subject to constitutional limitations. But, the SG contends 
that "every soverign possesses the right to regulate the manner 
and terms upon which property may be transmitted at death, 
as well as the authority to prescribe who shall and who shall 
not be capable of taking it." I observe here that although I 
am not familiar with the cases cited by the SG, I am not sure 
from reading his brief that anyone of them squarely supports 
the foregoing statement. As CA 8 observed, if the SG's state-
ment is taken literally, all fee simple interest in effect 
would be reduced to life estates. 
-
No. 85-637 5. 
I do not believe, however, that the Government's 
position depends on what seems to me to be a rather 
extreme statement. Here, § 207 is quite limited, as 
it affects only fractional interests of minimal value. 
These interests have resulted in intractable problems. 
Moreover, the owner of these interests may sell or donate 
them during his or her lifetime, and of course may retain 
any income - as unlikely as this may be. As a matter of 
common sense, the position of the Government has great 
appeal and I would like to find a principled basis for 
supporting it. 
The brief on behalf of appellees, however, is well written 
and makes a rather strong argument for the view that there has 
been a violation of the Fifth Amendment taking clause. As did 
CA 8, appellees rely on Choate v. Trapp. They argue that 
§ 207 is not "regulation of property interests". Rather, it 
is a "taking of such interests without compensation." 
No. 85-637 6. 
As I am not at rest, I would like a memorandum from my 
Clerk that addresses the validity of the Government's position 
that the State has plenary authority over the dispostion of 
property at death. I am not certain that if the Government is 
wrong in this position that it necessarily loses in this 
particular case, particularly in view of the fact that the 





To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: ~nald 
July 25, 1986 
Re: Hodel v. Irving, No. 85-63 
OJ-/._, '1 
Questions Presented by the SG• 
/ 
1. Whether section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation 
Act of 1983, 25 U.S.C. §2206, which provides that certain de 
minimis undivided fractional interests held by individual Indians 
in trust or restricted allotments shall not descend by intestacy 
or devise, but instead shall escheat to the tribe, results in a ------- - ___.._ ____ _ 
taking of private property without the payment of just compensa-
tion, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. 
L.. 
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that 
Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, as amended by 
Congress in 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-608, 98 Stat. 3171, also is un-
constitutional, even though the amended version does not apply to 
any of the interests in allotments covered by appellees' dece-
dents. 
I. Background and Proceedings Below 
The issues raised by this case require an unusually de-
tailed factual statement, beginning with the Treaty of Fort Lara-
mie, April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, which created the Great Reser-
vation of the Sioux Nation in South Dakota. That treaty vested 
the Sioux tribe with title to most of what is now South Dakota. 
In the 1880s, Congress instituted a policy of transferring land 
from the Indian tribes to the members of the respective tribes. 
Under section 12 of the Treaty of Fort Laramie, Congress could 
not make such a transfer of the Sioux lands without consent of 
three quarters of the adult male Sioux. Congress first attempted 
to transfer these lands by means of an Act of Apr. 30, 1888, ch. 
206, 25 Stat. 94. Because the Sioux rejected the provisions of 
the 1888 Act, Congress made minor changes and repassed the stat-
ute as the Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888 (the "Sioux 
Allotment Act 11 or 11 SAA 11 } • The Sioux accepted the 1889 statute 
and the allotment program began. 
Under the Sioux Allotment Act, each member of the tribe 
would eventually receive a parcel of 160, 80, or . 40 acres, de-
3. 
pending on a variety of circumstances. SAA §8. To prevent im-
provident alienation, the allotted parcels were to be held in 
trust by the United States for 25-35 years. SAA §11. Finally, 
the SAA identified the beneficiary of the trust as "the Indian to 
whom such allotment shall have been made, or, in case of his de-
cease, of his heirs according to the laws of the State or Terri-
tory where such land is located." Id. In 1934, Congress reject-
ed the allotment policy in the Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 
576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 u.s.c. §461 et seq.} (the 
"IRA"}. That statute prohibited further allotments and extended 
indefinitely the period during which the United States would hold 
the land in trust. 
Over the years, the Indians' individual interests in the 
allotted parcels became increasingly fractionated. For example, 
eated in this case was a 1/3645 undivid-
--~------------~~--------------ed interest in a 320.12 acre tract. Nor was this fractionation 
of interest uncommon; in 1960 a Senate Report noted that 1/4 of 
all allotted parcels were owned by more than six heirs. This 
fractionation caused several problems. Most importantly, it made 
sale or lease of many parcels practically impossible, because of 
the difficulty of discovering the identity of, and securing con-
sent from, the fee owners. The accounting costs incurred by the 
government rose with the fractionation also, so that many parcels 
did not generate enough income to cover their share of the ac-
counting expenditures. 
In response to this problem, Congress enacted the Indian 
Land Consolidation Act of 1983 ("ILCA"}. Section 207 of that Act 
~. 
("section 207"} provided that small interests in allotted parcels 
would escheat, from the individual Indian to the particular 
tribe, on the death of the owner. The escheated interests were 
those that constituted both (a} less than 2% of the entire par-
cel, and (b) earned their owner less than $100 income in the pre-
ceding year. Congressional amendments in 1984, which are not 
directly applicable to this case, relaxed the requirements so 
that no parcel would escheat if the heir could show that the par-
cel was capable of earning $100 in any of the five years after 
death. The 1984 amendments also proscribed the escheat of inter-
ests devised to persons who owned other interests in the same 
parcel. Finally, under the new statute, individual tribes can 
adopt their own codes to deal with this problem, so long as they 
accomplish the statutory purpose. 
Appellees filed this action challenging the statute 
under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the federal 
constitution. Appellees are heirs or potential heirs of persons 
who possessed interests subject to escheat under ILCA §207. The 
district court rejected the claim, but CA8 reversed, holding that 
the statute took property without compensation. 
II. Discussion 
In this memo, I address the following three issues: ( 1} 
standing, (2} taking, and (3} Texaco v. Short. I conclude that 
there is standing, that there was not a taking, and that the 
Texaco claim fails. 
5. 
A. Standing 
Although the parties do not contest standing, it is a 
substantial question. The lower court struck down section 207 
not because it took property from Irving, but because it took 
property from Irving's decedent. On appeal, the appellees "seek 
only to establish the vested property interest of their dece-
dents." Brief for the Appellees, at 13 n. 3. Despite the SG' s 
implicit concession, the Court still should examine the question. 
See, e.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 106 s. 
Ct. 1326 (1986). 
This issue presents two separate inquiries: first, 
whether Irving can meet the Article III requirements of injury-
in-fact and controversy; second, whether this Court should apply 
its prudential standing limitations to bar review. See, e.g., 
Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 u.s. 947, 954-55 
(1984). In this case, the Article III requirements are satis-
fied. First, Irving has lost interests in land that she would 
not have lost except for application of section 207; second, she 
has litigated this case with sufficiently "concrete adverseness," 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204-05 {1962), to present a case or 
controversy within the meaning of Article III. 
Whether the Court should exercise its prudential power 
to hear the case is not so clear. The Court once stated: "Ordi-
narily, one may not claim standing in this Court to vindicate the 
constitutional rights of some third party." Barrows v. Jackson, 
346 u.s. 249, 255 (1953). The application of this rule--commonly 
o. 
referred to as the jus tertii rule--furthers two separate inter-
ests: first, that "courts should not adjudicate such rights un-
necessarily, and it may be that in fact the holders of those 
rights do not wish to assert them": and second, that "third par-
ties themselves usually will be the best proponents of their own 
rights." Singleton v. Wulff, 428 u.s. 106, 113-14 (1976) (plu-
rality opinion of JUSTICE BLACKMUN). The modern Court has relied 
on two factual elements in deciding this question: the relation-
ship of the litigant to the rightholder: and "some genuine obsta-
cle" to assertion of the right by the rightholder. Id., at 112-
114 (1976). 
You dissented from JUSTICE BLACKMUN 1 s standing discus-
sion in Singleton. You argued that the standing requirement had 
not previously been satisfied by a "genuine obstacle," but only 
"when such litigation is in all practicable terms impossible." 
Id., at 126. You argued that the prudential inquiry should turn 
not on the "quality of advocacy," but on the "proper judicial 
role." Id., at 124 & n.3 (citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 u.s. 288, 
346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). The general thrust of 
your opinion was that JUSTICE BLACKMUN 1 s approach confused the 
constitutional and prudential inquiries and that it paved the way 
for decisions that could completely ignore the prudential consid-
erations put so forcefully by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander. 
This prediction has come true, as the most recent decision in 
this area (a decision which you did not join) demonstrates. See 
Munson, 467 u.s., at 954-59 (rejecting a jus tertii claim, even 
7. 
though the plaintiff made no showing that the actual rightholders 
were incapable of bringing suit). 
In Craig v. Boren, 429 u.s. 190 (1976), a full Court 
endorsed JUSTICE BLACKMON's opinion in Singleton. JUSTICE BREN-
NAN's opinion for the Court, which you joined, stated: 
The[] prudential objectives [supporting the jus tertii 
rule] cannot be furthered here, where the lower court 
has entertained the relevant constitutional challenge 
and the parties have sought--or at least have never 
resisted--an authoritative constitutional determina-
tion. In such circumstances, a decision by us to forgo 
consideration of the constitutional merits in order to 
await the initiation of a new challenge to the statute 
by injured third parties would be impermissibly to fos-
ter repetitive and time-consuming litigation under the 
guise of caution and prudence." Id., at 193-94 • 
....cr..s_ City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 
239, 243 (1983) (rejecting a jus tertii challenge because accept-
ance would lead to dismissal of the writ of certiorari, and af-
firmance of the state court decision in which the plaintiffs 
won). 
In light of Craig, I think the Court will find Irving's 
standing sufficient. Craig resolved a question very similar to 
~
the one here without any examination of the need to avoid unnec-
essary adjudication of constitutional questions. The language 
quoted above could dispose of the standing issue here without 
further discussion. Although I have substantial reservations 
about this disposition, based on your opinion in Singleton, 428 
u.s., at 123-24 & n.3, I will not belabor the point in this al-
ready lengthy memorandum. I have outlined my thoughts on this 
question in a separate memorandum and will provide a more de-
tailed discussion if you are interested. 
o. 
B. Taking 
In this section I address first the general taking 
clause analysis applicable to this question and then the specific 
Indian-based concerns that controlled CAS's decision of the case. 
1. Takings in General. --Legislatures have broad power 
to regulate the descent of property, whether by will or by intes-
tate succession. In fact, the Court has stated that "[n] othing 
~r in t~e { ederal Consti~ forbids ~~e legislature of a state to 
.~r~~it, co~n, ~-abolish~e power o~ ' testamentar; ' dis­
posi tion over property within its jurisdiction." Irving Trust 
Co. v. ~ 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942); see 5 G. Thompson, Commen-
taries on the Modern Law of Real Property §§2405-2406 (1979). 
Nor is this broad power inapplicable to Indians. See Tooahnippah 
v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598,609 (1970); id. at 612-13 (Harlan, J., 
concurring); Jefferson v. Fink, 247 u.s. 288, 294 (1918). 
With the breadth of this power in mind, I turn to the 
takings analysis. The Court's most recent analysis of this ques-
tion has focused on three factors: 
(1) "the economic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant"; (2) "the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions"; and ( 3) "the character of the governmental ac-
tion." vconnolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 106 
s. Ct. 1018, 1026 (1986) (quoting Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City, 438 u.s. 104, 124 
(1978)). 
~ f As to the economic impact, Congress has li~ted the ap-
.....r ~~plication of section 207 to small interests, specifically those t.N-Y"". 
~~ that both (a) constitute less tha~ of the affected parcel, and 
9. 
{b) earned the decedent less than $100 in the year immediately 
preceding death. The SG argues that "Congress reasonably could 
determine that such an interest is sufficiently de minimis in its 
relative economic value and reflects a sufficiently insubstantial 
stake in the allotted parcel as a whole to warrant its devolution 
to the tribe in lieu of still further fractionation." Brief for 
the Appellant, at 33. Moreover, because the Indians can still 
make inter vivos transfers of their interests, they have some 
chance of retaining the economic value of their interests. This 
factor favors the SG. 
Nor does the statute interf€re with an investment-backed 
expectation. All of the individual interests in allotted parcels 
----·---···---- -~ 
were acquired without anv investment whatsoever by the individual 
,...___-------~-
interests; Congress simply transferred title from the tribe to .._,__, 
the individuals. Moreover, it is unlikely that a substantial ...._________.. 
number of the escheated interests have received improving invest-
ments; if they had, they probably would not have been so value-
less as to come within the reach of section 207. 
~) 
Only on the~~--the nature of the government 
action--do the parties join issue. The SG makes several argu-
ments worthy of mention here. First, he points out that the land 
has not been escheated back to the federal government, but to the 
tribe. The individual Indians retain an interest in common 
through their tribal membership. Thus, "[a] lthough the escheat 
of any particular parcel might advrsely affect [one Indian, they] 
presumably stand to benefit by the escheat of other interests to 
the tribe." Id., at 32. 
.LUo 
More importantly from my point of view, Congress acted 
------
here to increase the net value of the allotted parcels, not to 
transfer some interest from a private party to the government. 
Under the old system, the administrative costs on many parcels 
exceeded the income of the parcels. The divided ownership made 
economically productive use of the land all but impossible. The 
new system is designed to alleviate that problem, increase effec-
tive use of the land, and thus provide more income for all mem-
bers of the tribe. I think this is like the "reciprocity of ad-
vantage" described by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Whatever the other defects of 
that opinion, I think there is something of substance to this 
point. 
Finally, on the doctrinal front, the SG argues that this 
case is governed by Andrus v. Allard, 444 u.s. 51, 65-66 (1979). 
That case considered a federal statute that prohibited the com-
mercial sale of certain parts of protected birds, mostly bald and 
golden eagles. The Court rejected a takings clause challenge, 
stating: 
The regulations challenged here do not compel 
the surrender of the artifacts, and there is no physi-
cal invasion or restraint upon them. Rather, a signif-
icant restriction has been imposed on one means of dis-
posing of the artifacts. But the denial of one tradi-
tional property right does not always amount to a tak-
ing. At least where an owner possesses a full "bundle" 
of property rights, the destruction of one "strand" of 
the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must 
be viewed in its entirety .••. 
The SG focuses on the important rights retained by the decedents 
~ ------------in this case. The statute does not alter their rights to use, 
--......._ 
enter, sell, or earn income from the parcel. It only prevents 
11. 
them from passing it at death unless they purchase sufficient 
other interests in the same parcel to put their interest out of 
the reach of section 207. 
Irving argues that Allard is inapplicable because "the 
result of taking this 'strand' is to extinguish the property in-
terests of the decedents." Brief for the Appellees, at 30 (cit-
ing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 
(1982)). In Loretto the Court found a taking because the govern-
mental action did "not simply take a single 'strand' from the 
'bundle' of property rights: it chop[ped] through the bundle, 
taking a slice of every strand." Id. at 434-35. I do not think 
Loretto is helpful here. Loretto acknowledged that it dealt with 
the special circumstances of a permanent physical invasion, which 
almost always constitutes a taking. See id., at 432. 
I do not think this 
ll 
is a taking. 
l' 
In short, The first 
two Penn Central factors favor the SG. On the only questionable 
factor--the nature of the governmental action--! lean toward the 
SG. The only strand extinguished here is one traditionally sub-
ject to plenary government control. When that control is exer-
cised to benefit the owners of the interests in question, I do 
not think the takings clause is offended. 
2. The Indian Allotment Acts.--Finally, I address the 
peculiar circumstances of the allotment acts to determine whether 
those statutes granted the Indians a contractual right beyond the 
reach of subsequent governmental alteration. The Court has twice 
addressed takings challenges to congressional changes of the 
12. 
terms under which allotments had been given to Indians; although 
neither of those cases concerned the Sioux Allotment Act, they 
establish the principles of interpretation that should govern 
this case. 
In Choate v. Trapp, 224 u.s. 665 (1912), the Court faced 
the following facts. When Congress allotted parcels to the Choc-
taw and Chickasaw tribes in 1898, it expressly provided "that the 
land should be non-taxable" for a certain period of time. In 
1908, Congress removed the tax exemption provided in the original 
allotment act. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment prevented 
Congress from removing the tax exemption. The Court noted: 
Under the provisions of the Fifth Amendment there was 
no more power to deprive him of the exemption than of 
any other right in the property. No statute would have 
been valid which reduced his fee to a life estate, or 
attempted to take from him ten acres, or fifty acres, 
or the timber growing on the land. Id., at 674. 
Six years later the Court considered a similar case in 
Jefferson v. Fink, 247 u.s. 288 (1918). The Creek allotment act 
provided that descent of the allotted parcels would be governed 
by Arkansas law. In 1908, after the Creek reservation became 
part of the state of Oklahoma, Congress provided that future de-
scents would be governed by Oklahoma law. The Court, without 
citing Choate, upheld this statute. Justice Van Devanter argued: 
"What was said about the rules of descent was purely legislative, 
not contractual .... Like other rules of descent it was subject 
to change by the law-making power as to any land not already 
passed to the heir by the death of the owner." Id., at 294. 
Irving tries to bring her case within the rule of Choate 
by arguing that the Sioux bargained for, and received, a contrac-
.l.j. 
tual promise that Congress would not ~estrict the hereditability 
of the parcels. The relevant section of the Sioux Allotment Act 
provides: 
That upon the approval of the allotments provided for 
in this act by the Secretary of the Interior, he shall 
cause patents to issue therefor in the name of the al-
lottees, which patents shall ... declare that the Unit-
ed States does and will hold the lands thus allotted 
for the period of twenty-five years, in trust for .•. 
the Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made, 
or, in case of his decease, of his heirs according to 
the laws of the State or Territory where such land is 
located. SAA §11, 25 Stat., at 891 (emphasis added). 
As the SG demonstrates, Irving's reading of the legisla-
tive history is simply untenable. First of all, although the 
Sioux Allotment Act was passed in 1889, the Sioux were not legal-
ly capable of disposing of property by will until the Act of June 
25, 1910, §2, ch. 431, 36 Stat. 855, 856; see Tooahnippah v. 
Hickel, 397 U.S. 598, 613 & n.4 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
It is difficult to accept an argument that the Sioux Allotment 
Act gave the Sioux a contractual right to pass land by will or by 
intestate succession, when the Sioux were statutorily prohibited 
from disposing of land by will for the two decades immediately 
after passage of that act. 
Moreover, the sources of the language in the Sioux Al-
lotment Act demonstrate that Congress did not negotiate with the 
Sioux on this point. The relevant language in the Sioux Allot-
ment Act is identical to the language in the General Allotment 
Act. Compare General Allotment Act of 1887, §5, ch. 119, 24 
Stat. 388, 389, with Sioux Allotment Act, §11, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 
888, 891. The changes made between Congress's first offer to the 
Sioux, Act of Apr. 30, 1888, ch. 206, 25 Stat. 94, and the Sioux 
14. 
Allotment Act, have nothing to do with the question in this case. 
See S. Exec. Doc. 51, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1890), reprinted in 
2682 Serial Set. 
In short, even giving Irving the benefit of the doubt 
because of her Indian status, she cannot establish a contractual 
right granted by the Sioux Allotment Act; her claim must stand or 
fall on the statutory language alone. The language is not nearly 
so clear as the passage that led the Court to find a taking in 
Choate. In fact, I think the change here is completely indistin-
guishable from Pink. This conclusion is bolstered by the tone of 
the Choate opinion, which reflects an implicit conclusion that 
Congress' promise not to tax the parcels was a material part of 
the bargain that induced the Indians to accept allotments. 
The best argument in favor of Irving is the Court's 
statement in Choate that "[n] o statute would have been valid 
which reduced his fee to a life estate, or attempted to take from 
him ten acres, or fifty acres, or the timber growing on the 
land, " 2 2 4 u.S. at 6 7 4. I do not think this statement controls 
this case for three reasons. First, and least persuasively, the 
statement is clearly dictum. Second, section 207 does not reduce 
Irving's interest to a life estate; it allows her to convey by 
inter vivos transfer an interest that extends beyond her death. 
On the other hand, considering the lack of business sophistica-
tion of the affected Indians, this distinction should not receive 
great weight. Third, and most importantly, Choate itself notes 
that the private rights of Indians "are secured and enforced to 
the same extent and in the same way as other residents or citi-
.1!) • 
zens of the United States." Id., at ·677. The Choate Court be-
lieved that the Fifth Amendment takings clause analysis protected 
Indians just as much as it protected other citizens. Because I 
have concluded above that, apart from the Indian-specific con-
cerns of statutory construction, the takings clause challenge 
would fail, I think that Choate should not be interpreted to in-
validate section 207. 
In my view, there is no taking. 
C. Texaco, Inc. v. Short 
The Texaco argument is explicated most fully in 
the Brief Amicus Curiae of the Pacific Legal Foundation, but the 
case is mentioned i.n the Brief for the Appellees; I think you 
should consider it. 
In Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982}, the Court 
considered an Indiana statute that transferred abandoned mineral 
interests to the surface owner. It applied to any interest that 
had not been used for twenty years, unless the owner filed a doc-
ument within the two-year grace period after passage of the stat-
ute. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion for the Court rejected the argu-
ment that the mineral interest holders were entitled to specific 
notice. He stated: 
It is well established that persons owning property 
within a State are charged with knowledge of relevant 
statutory provisions affecting the control or disposi-
tion of such property. 
It is also settled that the question whether a 
statutory grace period provides an adequate opportunity 
for citizens to become familiar with a new law is a 
matter on which the Court shows the greatest deference 
to the judgment of state legislatures. 
[W]e cannot conclude that the statute was 
so unprecedented and so unlikely to come to the atten-
tion of citizens reasonably attentive to the enactment 
of laws affecting their rights that this 2-year period 
was constitutionally inadequate. Id., at 532-33. 
.LOo 
You joined JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent in Texaco. He ar-
gued that the scheme was unconstitutional because "there is no 
discernible basis for failing to afford those owners such notice 
as would make the saving proviso meaningful." Id., at 554. 
I do not think Texaco requires a holding that section 
207 is unconstitutional, even though the statute gave no notice 
to the owners of the interests to be escheated. Giving Congress 
the deference granted by the Texaco majority, and recognizing 
Congress' broad powers over Indians and over their ability to 
dispose of property at death, I assume the Court will conclude 
that section 207 is not offensive on this point. ( ~ oT ,A.Ut-y 
· But even under JUSTICE BRENNAN's approach, section 207 
should withstand scrutiny. The theory of his dissent just does 
not apply to these facts. The Indiana scheme provided that the 
interests were not automatically taken. They would survive if 
the interest owners filed with the state within two years. The 
state was not seeking to destroy the interests per se, just to 
force owners · to use them. · In JUSTICE BRENNAN's view, the state 
could not save the constitutionality of the statute from a 
takings challenge by putting in a grace period, but providing so 
little notice as to make it practically ineffective. 
Section 207 has an entirely different goal: destruction -of the tiny interests. It provided no grace period during which 
the Indians could save their interests; the only way an interest 
..L I • 
holder can protect his interest is to combine it with other in-
terests to put it beyond the reach of the statute. In this situ-
ation, where the goal of Congress is the destruction of the in-
terests themselves, the sole constitutional question is whether -------- - . --
Congress has the power to consolidate the interests; this is ..-- ---
judged most effectively under the takings clause. 
I do not think section 207 is a taking. Accordingly, I 
think CA8 should be reversed. I close with a few comments on the 
two versions of the statute. The ~ts to ILCA are not 
before this court. If this Court reverses CA8 and upholds the 
original version (as I have recommended), the lower courts will 
have no doubt that the more generous 1984 version is consti tu-
~dt.~ 
tional. If, however, this Court s-trikQ-8 €!own the original ver-
sion, it still might reverse CAS's declaration that the 1984 ver-
sion is unconstitutional. The 1984 version was not applied to 
any of the plaintiff class, so this Court would be free to leave 
that for another day. On the other hand, if the ground of deci-
sion is broad, this Court might include a footnote noting that it 
sees no meaningful distinction between the old and new versions 
of the statute. 
1;-/ 
e ?/28/86 L"~ ~ -?fA>·p~ 
~-~· 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell July 28, 1986 
From: Ronald 
Re: Hodel v. Irving, No. 85-637 
I have just received your memo of 21 July about this 
case. I have already sent you a bench memorandum in this case. 
As that memo states, I agree with your tentative conclusion that, 
on the facts of this case, the government's actions do not con-
stitute a taking. On the last page of your memo, you asked your 
Clerk to address the validity of the /overnment's position that 
the State has plenary authority over the disposition of property 
at death. My memo did not address this question because I felt 
that the case could be disposed of under the takings analysis. 
2. 
Because your memo seems to indicate agreement with this approach, 
I thought it was best not to go ahead with further research on 
the question of plenary authority. This is a substantial ques-
tion; in fact my reading thus far leads me to think the govern-
ment might not prevail on that point. At least in the context of 
allotted lands, Choate posts some limit to governmental power. 
If my memo fails to convince you that we need not ad-
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CHAM6ERS OF" 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
Dear Chief, 
October 9, 1986 
John Stevens has agreed to do the 
opinion in 85-637, Hodel v. Irving. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
' . 
CHAM BERS OF" 
THE C HI EF .JU STICE 
~u.pt"ttnt <ltltlUi at tfrt ~b ~btftg 
~ulfinghtn. ~. <lt· 2ll.gt~~ 
October 20, 1986 
RE: No. 85-637 - Hodel v. Irving 
Dear Lewis: 
Would you be willing to take on a dissent in this case? 
Justice Powell 
Regards,~ 
Copy to Justice Brennan 
IJ ~ ,tfir.c c' 
J:.U ~ 1-t.~ID ~~ 
~~~~~ 
October 20, 1986 
85-637 Hodel v. Irving 
Dear Chief: 
I'll be qlad to draft a dissent in this case. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: Justice Brennan 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
.iU¥rtw <JI~rt a£ t4t ~ittb .italt.e' 
Pulfhtgton. ~. QI. 2llt?~~ 
November 3, 1986 
No. 85-637 Hodel v. Irving 
Dear John, 
Your draft opinion in this case goes off on a 
ground not raised by the parties - a Due Process ground 
resting on the holding of Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 u.s. 
516. The effect of your opinion seems to be that the 
Due Process Clause requires a grace period of reasonable 
length before a state may change the rules of intestate 
succession or laws governing disposition by will. Although 
you state the holding is limited to the Indian trust 
relationship, I do not see how the reaponing can be so 
confined. Indeed, Texaco, Inc. v. Short was not an Indian 
case. The rationale strikes me as unduly broad and that 
it will throw into question a broad range of legislative 
changes. 
Although .I am still inclined to affirm the 
judgment below in part on the basis of the Takings Clause, 




Copies to the Conference 
-
Dear John, 
.iltJrttntt <ijourt ctf tlrt ~tb ,i~g 
.. as!fingbm. ~. <ij. 2n.;;~~ 
November 4, 1986 
I share Sandra's concerns both about reaching the 
due process issue and about the future effects of your 
proposed analysis on changes in the law of intestate 
succession. I also remain of the view that §207's 
elimination of the right to pass property by will 
violates the takings clause, although its change in 
what appens to property absent a will does not. 
Finally, I think it is possible to find standing here 
under a more limited theory that would retain more of 
the prudential third-party standing bar. 
I intend to try my hand at an opinion along these 




Copies to the Conference 
~ovember 5, 1986 
85-637 Hodel v. Irving 
Dear John: 
At Conference I was tentatively inclined to reverse 
~A8. 
A clear majority at Confe~~nce vote~ to affirm, but 
there was considerable diversity of opinion as to the basts 
of the Court''3 decision. Letter.:; from Sandra and Nino inlii.-
cate that differences continue to exist. 
As 1 am not at rest, I will await further writinq 
before deciding what to do. 
Sincerely, 
Justice W4MY+ ~ 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
.l\tqtrtmt <ll~ atf tift 'Jnittb jltalu' 
Jlag~ J. <!f. 20.?"' 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE November 6, 19~ 
85-637 - Hodel v. Irving 
Dear John, 
Please join me. 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBf:RS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY('<. BLACKMUN 
~mtt Qfltlttt &tf tlf.t ~nit.tlt ,Statts 
._bJrittgtott. ~. Qf. 2ll,?'l~ 
.Re: No. 85-637, Hodel v. Irving 
Dear John: 
November 10, 1986 
I find myself in somewhat the same position as that 
taken by Sandra and Nino in this case. My approach was on 
"taking," not "abandonment." The Government, in fact, has 
not argued abandonment and, for now, I am hesitant to pur-
sue that path. I had assumed that the Sioux owners here 
actually "use" the property in the sense . of receiving in-
come. 
I therefore refrain from joining your opinion at this 
time. I perhaps shall wait to see what Nino has to say in 
his separate writing, but it may turn out that I cannot 
join him either. In that event, I shall await further 




cc: The Conference 
rjm 11/14/86 
/ 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Ronald 
Re: 85-637, Hodel v. Irving 
You asked for a short dissent of four to five pages. It was 
my understanding that you wanted a general statement memorializ-
ing your conclusions, rather than a detailed statement attempting 
to persuade others to go your way. In print, this should come 
out to just under five pages. 
I decided not to address the merits of the notice question. 
The question is not susceptible of simple, brief treatment. 
Moreover, although I think we could quickly produce something 
that reflects the views you expressed by joining JUSTICE BREN-
NAN's opinion in Texaco, I do not think THE CHIEF JUSTICE would 
join such an opinion. 
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85-637 Hodel v. Irving 
Dear Chief 1 
This refers to your li~t of October cases that ar.e 
still pending. 
~?hen John's op in ton •..;a s c ircu la ted, 1 ,.,rote h lm on 
November 5 - w!th copies to the Conference - saying that I 
would await other writing. I am not at rest in this case, 
~nd want to see what Nino writes. 
Sincerely, 






JUSTICE PCM ELL 
Ronald 
No. 85-637, Hodel v. Irving 
Apparently, the Chief's comments at Conference convinced 
JUSTICE SCALIA to circulate his opinion in this case. In Part I, 
he explains why the Court of Appeals was correct in rejecting 
resps' claims that they themselves were deprived of anything. 
This part is fine. 
In Part II, he explains why he thinks resps have standing to 
litigate this claim. He finds standing, because "the Court of -
Appeals effectively made an appointment of a personal representa-
tive of the decedents for purposes of this suit, just as a pro-
bate court would be required to do where the decedent has failed 
to select one." 1st Draft, at 4. I find thi 
doubt that you should join it. 
Your cases establish a two-part test for third-party stand-
ing :<1fner:e must be some relationship between the party asserting 
the right and the holder of the right; and there must be a "genu-, 
ine obstacle" to assertion of the right. se r singleton v. Wulff, 
428 U.S. 106, 112-114 (1976) (plurality opinion of JUSTICE BLACK-
MUN) ; id., at 126 (your opinion) (suggesting a more rigorous 
standard, that "such litigation is in all practicable terms irn-
possible") • In this case, there is standing under either stand-
ing. Because resps' decedents are dead, it is clear that they 
cannot press this claim. As you know, your opinions have been 
very restrictive on third party standing. You could make an ar-




6-7 (making such an argument). If you wish to find standing, I 
think you should do so on the traditional grounds outlined above, 
'------------------~-----------
rather than the novel grounds outlined by JUSTICE STEVENS (in his 
'--··----- -·-----~
circulating draft) or JUSTICE SCALIA (in this opinion). 
Part III of JUSTICE SCALIA's opinion explains why he finds a 
taking. In his view, there is a taking because the government 
has taken the right to pass the property to children. In his 
view, this is such a fundamental right that any interference with 
it would be a taking. He goes on to suggest that compensation is 
required in "all cases where the reallocation of property rights 
is the a~knowledged purpose of the government action." This case 
aside, I doubt you will subscribe to such a broad statement. 
It is not clear whether we now are obligated to write. The 
Chief's clerk called to ask what we would do. I told him that I 
expected you would consult with his boss about this.~ attach a 
copy of the draft dissent I wrote earlier this fall. I have re-
viewed that opinion and do not think it is very good. It would ~ 
require some refurbishing before it could be circulated.~
ticular, I think we should adapt it to fit in with the circulat-
ing opinions in Keystone and First English Evangelical. 







From: Justice Scalia 
Circulate~ : F£8 2 J 1987 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
DONALD P. 
RIOR, 
TARY OF THE INTE-
ARY IRVING ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1987] 
JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring 
I do not believe the Court should decide whether § 207 of 
the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, 96 Stat. 2517, 25 
U. S. C. § 2206, violates the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment-a question not raised or argued at any stage of 
this litigation. To strike down an Act of Congress on a 
ground that the Secretary has not even had an opportunity to 
address displays, in my view, inadequate respect for both the 
coordinate branches of government. Conversely, it seems to 
me that we should decide the question the parties did brief 
and argue both here and below: whether § 207 effects a taking 
of property without just compensation, in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
I 
Appellees contended below that by virtue of the statute 
they were themselves deprived of property protected by the 
Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals properly rejected 
that contention. When the statute was enacted, none of the 
members of the Tribe from whom A.ppellees would have re-
ceived the property by will or intestacy had died. Appellees' 
interest in the property was therefore entirely contingent, 
since the then-provided disposition could have been altered at 
any time by their decedents' making or changing their wills, 
see 25 U. S. C. §§ 373, 464 (1982), or by change in the gov-
erning law of intestate disposition, see Act of Mar. 2, 1889, 
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ch. 405, § 11, 25 Stat. 888, 891. Enactment of the statute, 
therefore, deprived appellees of "a mere unilateral expecta-
tion," Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 
U. S. 155, 161 (1980), that does not constitute a property 
right within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Ibid. 
See Irving Trust Co . v. Day, 314 U. S. 556, 562 (1940); Jef- J 
ferson v. Fink, 247 U. S. 288, 293-294 (1918). 
Appellees attempted to argue that, even though potential 
heirs ordinarily do not have a property right, the trust pat-
ents given to the Oglala Sioux gave heirs a vested interest. 
As the Court of Appeals determined, the language of the 
statute providing for the patents will not bear that interpre-
tation. Irving v. Clark , 758 F. 2d 1260, 1265 (CA8 1985). 
The Oglala patents were to declare 
"that the United States does and will hold the lands thus 
allotted . . . in trust for the sole use and benefit of the 
Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made, or, 
in case of his decease, of his heirs according to the laws 
of the State or Territory where such land is located . . . 
Provided further, That the law of descent and partition 
in force in the State or Territory where the lands may be 
situated shall apply thereto .... " Act of Mar. 2, 1889, 
ch. 405, § 11, 25 Stat. 888, 891. 
That cannot reasonably be interpreted to create vested rights 
in any particular heirs , since the heirs are to be determined in 
accordance with "the law of descent and partition in force in 
the State or Territory where the lands may be situated." 
Ibid. See Jefferson v. Fink , supra, at 293-294. Moreover, f 
as the Court of Appeals noted, vested rights in prospective 
heirs are inconsistent with the Oglala Sioux' power to make 
wills, see 25 U. S. C. §§ 373, 464, upon the validity of which 
the claims of Elaine Bissonette, one of the appellees, are 
premised. Irving v. Clark, supra, 758 F. 2d, at 1265. 
85-637-CONCUR 
HODEL v. IRVING 3 
II 
Although before this Court appellees no longer assert that 
the Indian Land Consolidation Act violates their own con-
stitutional rights, they do seek to defend the Eighth Circuit's 
conclusion that it violates the property rights of their dece-
dents. Before reaching the merits of that claim, it is neces-
sary to determine that appellees have standing to assert the 
rights of third parties. 1 I believe that they do, but would 
rest that conclusion on narrower grounds than JUSTICE 
STEVENS. 
For obvious reasons, it has long been recognized that the 
surviving claims of a decedent must be pursued by a third 
party. As the Court of Appeals stated, if there is a right 
protected by the Fifth Amendment to pass property after 
death, one feature of that right must be that a claim arising 
from its violation survives the testator's death; otherwise, 
the right would be nugatory. Irving v. Clark, supra, 758 F. 
2d, at 1267. 
At common law, a decedent's surviving claims were prose-
cuted by the executor or administrator of the estate, depend-
ing on whether the decedent died testate or intestate. For 
Indians with trust property, statutes require the Secretary 
of the Interior to assume that general role. 25 U. S. C. 
§§ 371-380. The Secretary's responsibilities in that capacity, 1 
however, include the administration of the statute that appel-
lees claim is unconstitutional, see 25 U. S. C. §§ 2201-2210, l 
so that he can hardly be expected to assert appellees' dece-
dents' rights to the extent they turn on that point. 
Under these circumstances, appellees can appropriately 
serve as their decedents' representatives for purposes of as-
serting the latter's Fifth Amendment rights. They are best 
situated to pursue the claims vigorously, since their interest 
in receiving the property is indissolubly linked to the dece-
1 For the reasons stated by JUSTICE STEVENS, ante, at 7 and n. 10, I 
agree that appellees have suffered injury in fact as a result of the statute. 
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dents' right to dispose of it by will or intestacy. See ante, at (' 
8. The view that they are the appropriate representatives is 
consistent with the Uniform Probate Code (West), which pro-
vides that where a testator has failed to select an executor in 
his will, or where a decedent has died intestate, devisees and 
heirs have priority for appointment as personal represent-
atives of the decedent. § 3-203. In recognizing appellees' 
standing to assert their decedents' rights, the Court of Ap-
peals effectively made an appointment of a personal repre-
sentative of the decedents for purposes of this suit, just as a 
probate court would be required to do where the decedent 
has failed to select one, or where his selection is defective. 
Cf. Tooahnipah v. Hickel, 397 U. S. 598, 600 (1970) (Court \ 
assumed that where statute provided that a will could be ap-
proved by the Secretary of Interior "before or after the death 
of the testator," beneficiaries were the appropriate persons 
to seek approval of a will after death). Such an appointment ) 
is a "settled practice of the courts" that is an exception to the 
general rule that a litigant cannot raise the rights of third 
parties. Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 
u. s. 405, 406 (1900). 
III 
As to the merits of the claims appellees assert on behalf of 
their decedents, it should :first be noted that § 207 affected 
appellees' decedents' dispositions of their property at death 
in two ways. First, it changed the law of intestate succes-
sion by providing that the property would no longer descend 
by intestacy according to the law of the State where the prop-
erty was located, but instead would escheat to the Tribe. 
Second, it precluded the decedents from having their prop-
erty descend by will. The combined effect of these restric-
tions is to deprive appellees' decedents absolutely of all abil-
ity to have their property descend even to their children or \ 
close relatives after their death. 
The Secretary suggests (without quite arguing) that a leg-
islature has unlimited power to revise the law of succession, 
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since it is of statutory creation. I know of no authority for 
that proposition. 2 In several cases we have stated that the 
legislative power to regulate succession and testamentary 
disposition is very broad. See, e. g., Irving Trust Co. v. 
Day, 314 U.S 556, 562 (1942); Magoun v. Illinois Trust & 
Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 288-291 (1898); United States 
v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 628 (1896); United States v. Fox, 
94 U. S. 315, 320-321 (1876); Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U. S. (23 
Wall.) 137, 148 (1874); Mager v. Grima, 48 U. S. (8 How.) 
490, 492-493 (1850). None of those cases involved Fifth 
Amendment claims, however, nor did any involve the rights 
of the decedent. Rather they were brought by would-be 
heirs or devisees in their own right. Moreover the statutes 
considered in those cases did not eliminate heirship com-
pletely, but merely altered the identity of the prospective 
heirs or imposed inheritance taxes. Nor did they come close 
to eliminating entirely the power to direct property by will. 
I am confident that in making these statements the Court did 
not have in mind the complete elimination of all power to 
leave property to one's family; and even if it did, the state-
ments are plainly dicta. 
The Secretary argues that since the present case does not 
involve physical appropriation or destruction of property, the 
2 Its logic, of course-that any right conferred by statute can be with-
drawn by statute-is erroneous. It has long been established, for exam-
ple, that statutory land grants cannot be revoked without running afoul of 
the constitutional prohibition on impairment of contracts. Fletcher v. 
Peck, 10 U. S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-36 (1810). They may be revoked or im-
paired where the statutory grant has reserved that right. See United 
States v. Fuller, 409 U. S. 488 (1973). But there is no basis for finding 
such a right of revocation implicit in the statutes giving the Oglala Sioux 
the right to pass property to their descendants. Even a statutory tax ex-
emption-a privilege ordinarily assumed to be held at the grace of the leg-
islature-has been held not subject to an implicit right of repeal where (as 
here) Indians have given up other claims to obtain it. Choate v. Trapp, 
224 U. S. 665 (1912). The right to leave property to one's family at death 
is a much more traditional property right, as to which a right of repeal is 
even less likely to have been implicitly retained. 
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Fifth Amendment question must be decided on the basis of 
the "ad hoc, factual inquir[y ]" that we conduct when a state 
regulates the use of property. Brief for Appellant 30, quot-
ing Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,-- U. S. 
-- (1986). I disagree. We have applied the "regulatory 
takings" approach to laws that have an incidental effect on 
property rights, but whose primary purpose is not to reallo-
cate property. In that context, as the Court explained in 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 
U. S. 104 (1978), it is necessary to determine "whether the 
interference with [the claimant's] property is of such magni-
tude that 'there must be an exercise of eminent domain and 
compensation to sustain [it]."' Id., at 136, quoting Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 413 (1922) (empha-
sis added). 
It would be a dangerous expansion, however, to extend 
that approach beyond the incidental effects of the govern-
ment's exercise of its regulatory powers, to what is substan-
tially the exercise of eminent domain itself-that is, to gov-
ernment action that has as its very purpose the transfer of 
property ownership. And that is the situation we confront 
here. The present statute does not seek to further the pub-
lic health, Mugler v. Kansas , '\23 U. S. 623, 668-669 (1887), 
preserve historically significant structures, Penn Central, 
supra, at 132, or prevent the destruction of a valuable na-
tional resource, Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 53 (1979). 
Rather, as the Secretary explains, its purpose is to create a 
new structure of ownership of land interests that Congress 
believes will be more beneficial to Indians. Brief for Appel-
lant 9-10. While we held in Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229 (1984), that such an objective was a 
"public purpose" for which the eminent domain power could 
be used, we assuredly did not hold that Congress could pur-
sue it by regulation, instead of through eminent domain. To 
the contrary, our holding that the law was constitutional was 
expressly conditioned on the "assum[piion] . . . that the 
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weighty demand of just compensation has been met." I d., at 
245. Where, as here, Congress has expressly stated that its 
objective is to create a new ownership structure for particu-
lar property, and where that is the public purpose that the 
government invokes to defend the statute in litigation, it 
would seem to me extraordinary not to require the eminent 
domain power, with its attendant safeguard of compensation, 
to be employed. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De 
Benedictis, -- U. S. -- (1987) [No. 85-1092, slip op. at 
13-20] (the purpose of the action is critical in assessing 
whether the government is required to proceed by eminent 
domain). Such an approach in no way threatens the govern-
ment's power to "adjust the benefits and burdens of economic 
life to promote the common good," Penn Central, supra, at 
124, because it does not require the government to "regulate 
by purchase," Allard, supra, at 65 (emphases added and 
deleted). 
In my view, the requirement of proceeding by eminent do-
main should apply in all cases where the reallocation of prop-
erty rights is the acknowledged purpose of the government 
action, no matter how insignificant those rights may be. 
That should at least be the rule, however, where the govern- ' 
ment abrogates a property right that is as central to owner-
ship as is the power to pass on property after one's death. 
Like the power to exclude others involved in Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U. S. 164 (1979), it is a traditionally un-
derstood concomitant of ownership. In one form or another, 
the right to pass on property-to one's family in particular-
has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since feu-
dal times, even when property owners held their land by vir-
tue of the grace of the King. See A. Simpson, An Introduc-
tion to the History of the Land Law 54-60, 171 (1961). In 
fact, as we have noted, "the general consent of the most en-
lightened nations has, from the earliest historical period, rec-
ognized a natural right in children to inherit the property of 
their parents." United States v. P~rkins, supra, at 628. 
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The Founding Fathers regarded the right to pass on prop-
erty as so important that its elimination as a criminal penalty 
is proscribed by the Constitution, even as a penalty for trea-
son. See Art. III , sec. 3, cl. 2 ("no Attainder of Treason 
shall work Corruption of Blood"). While we have long rec-
ognized the legitimacy of many forms of regulation of that 
right, its total abrogation withdraws from the owner "one of 
the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are com-
monly characterized as property." Kaiser Aetna, supra, at 
176.3 Thus, in Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665 (1912), this I 
Court said, by way of exemplifying what would constitute a 
quintessential taking, that "[n]o statute would have been 
valid which reduced [the owner's] fee to a life estate." Id., 
at 674. The statute at issue here does almost precisely 
that.4 
The Secretary contends that the takings clause may be 
avoided because the land goes to the Tribe rather than to the 
United States. There is no authority for that proposition. 
The fact that appellees may benefit somewhat more from the 
land's reversion to the Tribe than they would from its appro-
priation by the government might, if proven, justify an offset 
in determining the level of compensation. But the "reciproc-
ity of advantage" principle of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 
3 The Secretary also argues that appellees have not really been deprived 
of their right to transfer property at death, because they can convey the 
remainder inter vivos and retain a life estate. That is of course not equiv-
alent to passing property at death, since the inter vivos transfer is effective 
immediately and irrevocably, whereas a devisor may change his mind and 
revoke his disposition until his death. In any event, the suggested trans-
action would have to be approved by the Secretary of the Interior, 25 CFR 
§ 152.25, who would have ample grounds for disapproving it (indeed, might 
be compelled to disapprove it) on the ground that it would frustrate the 
policies of the statute at issue here. 
' Since the owners of fractionated shares retain a limited right to convey 
more than a life estate, see 25 CFR § 152.25, as well as to engage in a few 
other complicated transactions that at least in theory may avoid escheat at 
their death , see 25 CFR §§ 151.7, 152.33, they have not lost all interest in 
the remainder. But that retained interest is negligible. 
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260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922) and the dissent in Penn Central, 
438 U. S., at 140, requires that the burden be spread as 
broadly as the benefit, a state of affairs that nobody has con-
tended is present here. 
The government's policies on Indian ownership have 
shifted with every political and intellectual breeze. One of 
the purposes of electing legislatures is to make such shifts 
possible, and there is nothing constitutionally suspect about 
their occurrence. But if the government's new policy re-
quires the extinction of pre-existing property rights, justice 
and fairness require that the costs imposed by that policy be 
borne by society at large, and not by appellees. I would 
therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' ruling that Section 207 
violates the Fifth Amendment. 5 
5 I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that the Court of Appeals erred in de-
ciding the constitutionality of the amended statute. Ante, at 14, n.17. 
February 26, 1987 
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near Nino, 
Althou9h my Conference vote '11as the "other way", I 
am persuaded by your fine concurring opini.on. With a fe\t 
changes, I think I can join you. 
Some of the language in your opinion, particularly 
on pages 7 and 8, eppears to be inconsistent \-lith the Chief 
Justice's dissent in 85-1092, Keystone Bituminous Coal v. 
DeBenedictis. I have joined the Chief Justice in that case. 
The issu~s in this case ar~ qufte different from those that 
have split the Court i.n l~ycatone. 
Sincerely, 
Just i.ce Seal ia 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMeERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.ju.prmtt Ofourl of tift ~b .jtatt• 
Jfasltinghtn. ~. <!f. 21l~,.~ 
March 3, 1987 
Re: No. 85-637 Hodel v. Irving 
Dear Nino, 
Although I voted to reverse at Conference, I find the 
second draft of your opinion in this case quite persuasive, 
and if you could make the change hereafter discussed I will 
join it. 
You cite John's opinion in Keystone Bituminous on page 
7 for the proposition that the purpose of government action 
is critical in assessing whether the government is required 
to proceed by eminent domain. I have no objection to this, 
even though I am in dissent in Keystone. But the following 
sentence suggests, at least to me, that there may be a 
distinction between a "regulation" which does not involve a 
physical taking, even though all beneficial use is denied, 
and an outright physical taking. This is a matter on which 
the majority opinion and the dissent in Keystone apparently 
disagree, and I would prefer to see the lines drawn in that 
case rather than this. If you would delete this sentence, I 




cc: The Conference 
CH"MBERS OF 
JUSTICE: ANTONIN SCALIA 
Dear Chief: 
.. lqlftmt ~cntri Df tlft ~ittb .. talt.e 
,rulfinghnt. ~. ~· 2llc?,.~ 
Re: No. 85-637 - Hodel v. Irving 
March 3, 1987 
I did not intend to suggest what you feared, and have 
no problem whatever in deleting the last sentence of the 
first paragraph on page 7. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
March 4, 1987 
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Dear Nino: 
Please join me. 
Justice Scalia 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.l'u.pTmtt <!fltttrl of tift ~b .l'tatts 
~u4htghln. ~. <If. 2ll.;t~~ 
March 4, 1987 
Re: 85-637 - Hodel v. Irving 
Dear Nino: 
Please join me in your concurring opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Scalia 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS 01'" 
..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
March 18, 1987 
Re: No. 85-637 - Hodel, Secretary of Interior v. Irving 
Dear Sandra: 
I am uncomfortable with the last sentence on page 6 of 
your op1n1on. If you will eliminate that sentence, I shall 
be glad to join your opinion concurring in the judgment. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
Dear Harry, 
,hvrtmt <lfourt a£ tltt ltnittb .italt.e' 
'Jl~Jrhtgton. ~. Of. 2.llc?'l~ 
March 18, 1987 
No. 85-637 Hodel v. Irving 
Although some reference to the amended version 
of §207 is useful in my view, the point is not essential 
and I will drop it out of the next draft. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
4th DRAFT 
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-637 
DONALD P. HODEL, SECRETARY OF THE INTE-
RIOR, APPELLANT v. MARY IRVING ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT. OF APPEALS 
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[March - , 1987] 
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and 
JUSTICE POWELL join, concurring. 
I do not believe the Court should decide whether § 207 of 
the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, 96 Stat. 2517, 25 
U. S. C. § 2206, violates the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment-a question not raised or argued at any stage of 
this litigation. To strike down an Act of Congress on a 
ground that the Secretary has not even had an opportunity to 
address displays , in my view, inadequate respect for both-the 
coordinate branches of government. Conversely, it seems to 
me that we should decide the question the parties did brief 
and argue both here and below: whether § 207 effects a taking 
of property without just compensation, in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
I 
Appellees contended below that by virtue of the statute 
they were themselves deprived of property protected by the 
Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals properly rejected 
that contention. When the statute was enacted, none of the 
members of the Tribe from whom appellees would have re-
ceived the property by will or intestacy had died. Appellees' 
interest in the property was therefore entirely contingent, 
since the then-provided disposition could have been altered at 
any time by their decedents' making or changing their wills, 
see 25 U. S. C. §§ 373, 464 (1982), or by change in the gov-
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erning law of intestate disposition, see Act of Mar. 2, 1889, 
ch. 405, § 11, 25 Stat. 888, 891. Enactment of the statute, 
therefore, deprived appellees of "a mere unilateral expecta-
tion," Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 
U. S. 155, 161 (1980), that does not constitute a property 
right within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Ibid. 
See Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U. S. 556, 562 (1942); 
Jefferson v. Fink, 247 U. S. 288, 293-294 (1918). 
Appellees attempted to argue that, even though potential 
heirs ordinarily do not have a property right, the trust pat-
ents given to the Oglala Sioux gave heirs a vested interest. 
As the Court of Appeals determined, the language of the 
statute providing for the patents will not bear that interpre-
tation. Irving v. Clark, 758 F. 2d 1260, 1265 (CA8 1985). 
The Oglala patents were to declare 
"that the United States does and will hold the lands thus 
allotted . . . in trust for the sole use and benefit of the 
Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made, or, 
in case of his decease, of his heirs according to the laws 
of the State or Territory where such land is located . . . 
Provided further, That the law of descent and partition 
in force in the State or Territory where the lands may be 
situated shall apply thereto .... " Act of Mar. 2, 1889, 
ch. 405, § 11, 25 Stat. 888, 891. 
That cannot reasonably be interpreted to create vested rights 
in any particular heirs, since the heirs are to be determined in 
accordance with "the law of descent and partition in force in 
the State or Territory where the lands may be situated." 
Ibid. See Jefferson v. Fink, supra, at 293-294. Moreover, 
as the Court of Appeals noted, vested rights in prospective 
heirs are inconsistent with the Oglala Sioux' power to make 
wills, see 25 U. S. C. §§ 373, 464, upon the validity of which 
the claims of Elaine Bissonette, one of the appellees, are 
premised. Irving v. Clark, supra, 758 F. 2d, at 1265. 
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dents' right to dispose of it by will or intestacy. See ante, at 
8. The view that they are the appropriate representatives is 
consistent with the Uniform Probate Code (West), which pro-
vides that where a testator has failed to select an executor in 
his will, or where a decedent has died intestate, devisees and 
heirs have priority for appointment as personal represent-
atives of the decedent. § 3-203. In recognizing appellees' 
standing to assert their decedents' rights, the Court of Ap-
peals effectively made an appointment of a personal repre-
sentative of the decedents for purposes of this suit, just as a 
probate court would be required to do where the decedent 
has failed to select one, or where his selection is defective. 
Cf. Tooahnipah v. Hickel, 397 U. S. 598, 600 (1970) (Court 
assumed that where statute provided that a will could be ap-
proved by the Secretary of Interior "before or after the death 
of the testator," beneficiaries were the appropriate persons 
to seek approval of a will after death). Such an appointment 
is a "settled practice of the courts" that is an exception to the 
general rule that a ·litigant cannot raise the rights of third 
parties. Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 
u. s. 405, 406 (1900). 
III 
As to the merits of the claims appellees assert on behalf of 
their decedents, it should first be noted that § 207 affected 
appellees' decedents' dispositions of their property at death 
in two ways. First, it changed the law of intestate succes-
sion by providing that the property would no longer descend 
by intestacy according to the law of the State where the prop-
erty was located, but instead would escheat to the Tribe. 
Second, it precluded the decedents from having their prop-
erty descend by will. The combined effect of these restric-
tions is to deprive appellees' decedents absolutely of all abil-
ity to have their property descend even to their children or 
close relatives after their death. 
The Secretary suggests (without quite arguing) that a leg-
islature has unlimited power to revise the la.w of succession, 
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since it is of statutory creation. I know of no authority for 
that proposition. 2 In several cases we have stated that the 
legislative power to regulate succession and testamentary 
disposition is very broad. See, e. g., Irving Trust Co. v. 
Day, supra, 314 U.S., at 562; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & 
Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 288-291 (1898); United States 
v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 628 (1896); United States v. Fox, 
94 U. S. 315, 320-321 (1876); Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U. S. (23 
Wall.) 137, 148 (1874); Mager v. Grima, 48 U. S. (8 How.) 
490, 492-493 (1850). None of those cases involved Fifth 
Amendment claims, however, nor did any involve the rights 
of the decedent. Rather they were brought by would-be 
heirs or devisees in their own right. Moreover the statutes 
considered in those cases did not eliminate heirship com-
pletely, but merely altered the identity of the prospective 
heirs or imposed inheritance taxes. Nor did they come close 
to eliminating entirely the power to direct property by will. 
I am confident that in making these statements the Court did 
not have in mind the complete elimination of all power to 
leave property to one's family; and even if it did, the state-
ments are plainly dicta. 3 
2 Its logic, of course-that any right conferred by statute can be with-
drawn by statute-is erroneous. It has long been established, for exam-
ple, that statutory land grants cannot be revoked without running afoul of 
the constitutional prohibition on impairment of contracts. Fletcher v. 
Peck, 10 U. S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-36 (1810). They may be revoked or im-
paired where the statutory grant has reserved that right. See United 
States v. Fuller, 409 U. S. 488 (1973). But there is no basis for finding 
such a right of revocation implicit in the statutes giving the Oglala Sioux 
the right to pass property to their descendants. Even a statutory tax 
exemption-a privilege ordinarily assumed to be held at the grace of the 
legislature-has been held not subject to an implicit right of repeal where 
(as here) Indians have given up other claims to obtain it. Choate v. 
Trapp, 224 U. S. 665 (1912). The right to leave property to one's family at 
death is a much more traditional property right, as to which a right of re-
peal is even less likely to have been implicitly retained. 
3 In light of the careful distinction of these cases in the last five sen- \ 
tences, I am perplexed by JUSTICE O'CONNOR's statement that she "cau-' 
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The Secretary argues that since the present case does not 
involve physical appropriation or destruction of property, the 
Fifth Amendment question must be decided on the basis of 
the "ad hoc, factual inquir[y ]" that we conduct when a state 
regulates the use of property. Brief for Appellant 30, quot-
ing Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,-- U. S. 
-- (1986). I disagree. We have applied the "regulatory 
takings" approach to laws that have an incidental effect on 
property rights, but whose primary purpose is not to reallo-
cate property. In that context, as the Court explained in 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 
U. S. 104 (1978), it is necessary to determine "whether the 
interference with [the claimant's] property is of such magni-
tude that 'there must be an exercise of eminent domain and 
compensation to sustain [it]."' !d., at 136, quoting Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 413 (1922) (empha-
sis added). 
It would be a ·dangerous expansion, however, to extend 
that approach beyond the incidental effects of the govern-
ment's exercise of its regulatory powers, to what is substan-
tially the exercise of eminent domain itself-that is, to gov-
ernment action that has as its very purpose the transfer of 
property ownership. And that is the situation we confront 
here. The present statute does not seek to further the pub-
lic health, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 668-669 (1887), 
preserve historically significant structures, Penn Central, 
supra, at 132, or prevent the destruction of a valuable na-
tional resource, Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 53 (1979). 
Rather, as the Secretary explains, its purpose is to create a 
new structure of ownership of land interests that Congress 
believes will be more beneficial to Indians. Brief for Appel-
lant 9-10. While we held in Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229 (1984), that such an objective was a 
"public purpose" for which the eminent domain power could 
[not] join [me] in disa;:;proving" them. Ante, at -. 
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be used, we assuredly did not hold that Congress could pur-
sue it by regulation, instead of through eminent domain. To 
the contrary, our holding that the law was constitutional was 
expressly conditioned on the "assum[ption] . . . that the 
weighty demand of just compensation has been met." I d., at 
245. Where, as here, Congress has expressly stated that its 
objective is to create a new ownership structure for particu-
lar property, and where that is the public purpose that the 
government invokes to defend the statute in litigation, it 
would seem to me extraordinary not to require the eminent 
domain power, with its attendant safeguard of compensation, 
to be employed. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De 
Benedictis, -- U. S. -- (1987) (the purpose of the action 
is critical in assessing whether the government is required to 
proceed by eminent domain). 
In my view, the requirement of proceeding by eminent do-
main should apply in all cases where the reallocation of prop-
erty rights is the acknowledged purpose of the government 
action, no matter how insignificant those rights may be. 
That should at least be the rule, however, where the govern-
ment abrogates a property right that is as central to owner-
ship as is the power to pass on property after one's death. 
Like the power to exclude others involved in Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U. S. 164 (1979), it is a traditionally un-
derstood concomitant of ownership. In one form or another, 
the right to pass on property-to one's family in particular-
has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since feu-
dal times, even when property owners held their land by vir-
tue of the grace of the King. See A. Simpson, An Introduc-
tion to the History of the Land Law 54-60, 171 (1961). In 
fact, as we have noted, "the general consent of the most en-
lightened nations has, from the earliest historical period, rec-
ognized a natural right in children to inherit the property of 
their parents." United States v. Perkins, supra, at 628. 
The Founding Fathers regarded the right to pass on prop-
erty as so important that its elimination as a criminal penalty 
I .. 
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is proscribed by the Constitution, even as a penalty for trea-
son. See Art. III, sec. 3, cl. 2 ("no Attainder of Treason 
shall work Corruption of Blood"). While we have long rec-
ognized the legitimacy of many forms of regulation of that 
right, its total abrogation withdraws from the owner "one of 
the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are com-
monly characterized as property." Kaiser Aetna, supra, at 
176.4 Thus, in Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665 (1912), this 
Court said, by way of exemplifying what would constitute a 
quintess.ential taking, that "[nJo statute would have been 
valid which reduced [the owner's] fee to a life estate." !d., 
at 67 4. The statute at issue here does almost precisely 
that. 5 
The Secretary contends that the takings clause may be 
avoided because the land goes to the Tribe rather than to the 
United States. There is no authority for that proposition. 
The fact that appellees may benefit somewhat more from the 
land's reversion to the Tribe than they would from its appro-
priation by the government might, if proven, justify an offset 
in determining the level of compensation. But the "reciproc-
ity of advantage" principle of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 
260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922) and the dissent in Penn Central, 
438 U. S., at 140, requires that the burden be spread as 
'The Secretary also argues that appellees have not really been deprived 
of their right to transfer property at death, because they can convey ..the 
remainder inter vivos and retain a life estate. That is of course not equiv-
alent to passing property at death, since the inter vivos transfer is effective 
immediately and irrevocably, whereas a devisor may change his mind and 
revoke his disposition until his death. In any event, the suggested trans-
action would have to be approved by the Secretary of the Interior, 25 CFR 
§ 152.25, who would have ample grounds for disapproving it (indeed, might 
be compelled to disapprove it) on the ground that it would frustrate the 
policies of the statute at issue here. 
5 Since the owners of fractionated shares retain a limited right to convey 
more than a life estate, see 25 CFR § 152.25, as well as to engage in a few 
other complicated transactions that at least in theory may avoid escheat at 
their death, see 25 CFR §§ 151.7, 152.33, they have not lost all interest in 
the remainder. But that retained interest is negligible. 
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broadly as the benefit, a state of affairs that nobody has con-
tended is present here. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR criticizes the approach to appellees' 
claims advanced here as "creating a novel 'bright-line' rule." 
Ante, at --. I will not remark upon the "bright-line" 
. characterization, except to note my regret that it should be 
used as a term of reproach-particularly in this field, where 
clear rules are in such short supply that we have described 
our takings clause jurisprudence as a series of "essentially ad 
hoc factual inquiries." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 
supra, at 175. But insofar as novelty is concerned, it seems 
to me that JusTICE O'CONNOR's approach exemplifies that 
quality better than mine. For while it purports to adhere to 
traditional "regulatory taking" analysis, it effectively over-
rules without mention the unanimous decision of this Court in 
Andrus v. Allard, supra. In that case we held that an en-
dangered-species regulatory statute forbidding owners of le-
gally acquired bald or golden eagles or eagle parts from dis-
posing of them by sale was not a sufficient restriction on 
property rights to constitute a taking because "appellees re-
tain the right to possess and transport their property, and to 
donate or devise the protected birds." 444 U. S., at 66. 
Appellees here similarly retain the right to possess their 
property, as well as a limited right to transfer it inter vivos 
by gift or sale. It seems to me impossible to argue that ab-
rogation of their right to transfer it after death is a greater 
interference with property than abrogation of the Allard ap-
pellees' right to sell it during life, or that the former right is 
constitutionally more significant than the latter. If Allard is 
to be overruled, it should not be done sub silentio, nor do I 
think it necessary to confront that question in the present 
case. The approach I have taken distinguishes Allard on the 
basis that, while the right there at issue was equivalently im-
portant, it was eliminated to effectuate environmental regu-
lation, and not (as here) for the avowed purpose of transfer-
ring the property to someone else. 
J 
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The government's policies on Indian ownership have 
shifted with every political and intellectual breeze. One of 
the purposes of electing legislatures is to make such shifts 
possible, and there is nothing constitutionally suspect about 
their occurrence. But if the government's new policy re-
quires the extinction of pre-existing property rights, justice 
and fairness require that the costs imposed by that policy be 
borne by society at large, and not by appellees. I would 
therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' ruling that Section 207 
violates the Fifth Amendment. 6 
6 I agree with JuSTICE STEVENS that the Court of Appeals erred in 
deciding the constitutionality of the amended statute. Ante, at 14, n. 17. 
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INTERIOR, APPELLANT v. 
MARY IRVING ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1987] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether the original version 
of the "escheat" provision of the Indian Land Consolidation 
Act of 1983, Pub. L. 97-459, Tit. II, 96 Stat. 2519, effected 
a "taking" of appellees' decedents' property without just 
compensation. 
I 
Towards the end of the 19th century, Congress enacted a 
series of land Acts which divided the communal reservations 
of Indian tribes into individual allotments for Indians and 
unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement. This legislation 
seems to have been in part animated by a desire to force Indi-
ans to abandon their nomadic ways in order to "speed the In-
dians' assimilation into American society," Solem v. Bartlett, 
465 U. S. 463, 466 (1984), and in part a result of pressure to 
free new lands for further white settlement. Ibid. Two 
years after the enactment of the General Allotment Act of 
1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 et seq., Congress adopted a specific 
statute authorizing the division of the Great Reservation of 
the Sioux Nation into separate reservations and the allot-
ment of specific tracts of reservation land to individual 
Indians, conditioned on the consent of three-fourths of the 
adult male Sioux. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888 
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et seq. Under the Act, each male Sioux head of household 
took 320 acres of land and most other individuals 160 acres. 
25 Stat. 890. In order to protect the allottees from the 
improvident disposition of their lands to white settlers, the 
Sioux allotment statute provided that the allotted lands were 
to be held in trust by the United States. 25 Stat. 891. 
Until 1910 the lands of deceased allottees passed to their 
heirs "according to the laws of the State or Territory" where 
the land was located, ibid, and after 1910, allottees were 
permitted to dispose of their interests by will in accordance 
with regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior. 25 U. S. C. § 373. Those regulations generally served 
to protect Indian ownership of the allotted lands. 
The policy of allotment of Indian lands quickly proved di-
sastrous for the Indians. Cash generated by land sales to 
whites was quickly dissipated and the Indians, rather than 
farm the land themselves, evolved into petty landlords, leas-
ing their allotted lands to white ranchers and farmers and liv-
ing off the meager rentals. Lawson, Heirship: The Indian 
Amoeba, reprinted in Hearing on S. 2480 and S. 2663 Before 
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 
2d Sess., 82-83 (1984). The failure of the allotment program 
became even clearer as successive generations came to hold 
the allotted lands. Forty, eighty and 160 acre parcels be-
came splintered into multiple undivided interests in land, 
with some parcels having hundreds and many parcels having 
dozens of owners. Because the land was held in trust and 
often could not be alienated or partitioned the fractionation 
problem grew and grew over time. 
A 1928 report commissioned by the Congress found the 
situation administratively unworkable and economically 
wasteful. L. Meriam, Institute for Government Research, 
The Problem of Indian Administration 40-41 (1928). Good, 
potentially productive, land was allowed to lie fallow, amidst 
great poverty, because of the difficulties of managing prop-
erty held in this manner. Hearings on H. R. 11113 Before 
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the House Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the House Comm. 
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 
(1966) (remarks of Rep. Aspinall). In discussing the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, Representative Howard said: 
"It is in the case of the inherited allotments, however, 
that the administrative costs become incredible .... 
On allotted reservations, numerous cases exist where 
the shares of each individual heir from lease money may 
be 1 cent a month. Or one heir may own minute frac-
tional shares in 30 or 40 different allotments. The cost 
of leasing, bookkeeping, and distributing the proceeds in 
many cases far exceeds the total income. The Indians 
and the Indian Service personnel are thus trapped in a 
meaningless system of minute partition in which all 
thought of the possible use of land to satisfy human 
needs is lost in a mathematical haze of bookkeeping." 
78 Cong. Rec. 11728 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Howard). 
In 1934, in response to arguments such as these, the Con-
gress acknowledged the failure of its policy and ended further 
allotment of Indian lands. Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461. 
But the end of future allotment by itself could not prevent 
the further compounding of the existing problem caused by 
the passage of time. Ownership continued to fragment as 
succeeding generations came to hold the property, since, in 
the order of things, each property owner was apt to have 
more than one heir. In 1960, both the House and the Senate 
undertook comprehensive studies of the problem. See 
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong., 2d 
Sess., Indian Heirship Land Survey (Comm. Print 1960); 
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong., 
2d Sess., Indian Heirship Land Survey (Comm. Print 1960). 
These studies indicated that one-half of the approximately 12 
million acres of allotted trust lands were held in fractionated 
ownership, with over 3 million acres held by more than six 
, . . 
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heirs to a parcel. I d., at x (Part 2). Further hearings were 
held in 1966, Indian Fractionated Land Problems: Hearings 
on H. R. 11113 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the 
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1966), but not until Indian Land Consolidation Act 
of 1983 did the Congress take action to ameliorate the prob-
lem of fractionated ownership of Indian lands. 
Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act-the 
escheat provision at issue in this case-provided: 
"No undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust 
or restricted land within a tribe's reservation or other-
wise subjected to a tribe's jurisdiction shall descedent 
[sic] by intestacy or devise but shall escheat to that tribe 
if such interest represents 2 per centum or less of the 
total acreage in such tract and has earned to its owner 
less than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to 
escheat." 96 Stat. 2519. 
Congress made no provision for the payment of compensation 
to the owners of the interests covered by § 207. The statute 
was signed into law on January 12, 1983 and became effective 
immediately. 
The three appellees-Mary Irving, Patrick Pumpkin Seed, 
and Eileen Bisonette-are enrolled members of the Oglala 
Sioux Tribe. They are, or represent, heirs or devisees of 
members of the Tribe who died in March, April and June 
1983. Eileen Bisonette's decedent, Mary Poor Bear-Little 
Hoop Cross, purported to will all her property, including 
property subject to§ 207, to her five minor children in whose 
name Bisonette claims the property. Chester Irving, 
Charles Leroy Pumpkin Seed, and Edgar Pumpkin Seed all 
died intestate. At the time of their deaths, the four dece-
dents owned 41 fractional interests subject to the provisions 
of§ 207. App. 20, 22-28, 32-33, 37-39. The Irving estate 
lost two interests whose value together was approximately 
$100; the Bureau of Indian Affairs placed total values of ap-
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proximately $2,700 on the 26 escheatable interests in the 
Cross estate and $1,816 on the 13 escheatable interests in the 
Pumpkin Seed estates. But for § 207, this property would 
have passed, in the ordinary course, to appellees or those 
they represent. 
Appellees filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the District of South Dakota, claiming that § 207 resulted in a 
taking of property without just compensation in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment. The District Court concluded that 
the statute was constitutional. It held that appellees had no 
vested interest in the property of the decedents prior to their 
deaths and that Congress had plenary authority to abolish 
the power of testamentary disposition of Indian property and 
to alter the rules of intestate succession. App. to Juris. 
Statement 21a-26a. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 
758 F. 2d 1260. Although it agreed that the appellees had no 
vested rights in the decedents' property, it concluded that 
their decedents had a right, derived from the original Sioux 
Allotment Statute, to control disposition of their property at 
death. The Court of Appeals held that the appellees had 
standing to invoke that right and that the taking of that right 
without compensation to decedents' estates violated the Fifth 
Amendment.* 
II 
The Court of Appeals concluded that appellees have 
standing to challenge §207. 758 F. 2d, at 1267-1268. The 
Government does not contest this ruling. As the Court of 
Appeals recognized, however, the existence of a case or con-
*The Court of Appeals, without explanation, went on to "declare" that 
not only the original version of§ 207, but also the amended version not be-
fore it, 25 U. S. C. § 2206, unconstitutionally took property without com-
pensation. Since none of the property which escheated in this case did so 
pursuant to the amended version of the statute, this "declaration" is, at 
best, dicta. We express no opinion on the constitutionality of § 207 as 
amended. 
85-637-0PINION 
6 HODEL v. IRVING 
troversy is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's 
deliberations. I d., at 1267 n. 12. We are satisfied that the 
necessary case or controversy exists in this case. Section 
207 has deprived appellees of the fractional interests they 
otherwise would have inherited. This is sufficient injury-in-
fact to satisfy Article III of the Constitution. See Singleton 
v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 112 (1976). 
In addition to the constitutional standing requirements, we 
have recognized prudential standing limitations. As the 
court below recognized, one of these prudential principles is 
that the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights 
and interests. 758 F. 2d, at 1267-1268. That general prin-
ciple, however, is subject to exceptions. Appellees here do 
not assert that their own property rights have been taken un-
constitutionally, but rather that their decedents' right to pass 
the property at death has been taken. Nevertheless, we 
have no difficulty in finding the concerns of the prudential 
standing doctrine met here. 
For obvious reasons, it has long been recognized that the 
surviving claims of a decedent must be pursued by a third 
party. At common law, a decedent's surviving claims were 
prosecuted by the executor or administrator of the estate. 
For Indians with trust property, statutes require the Secre-
tary of the Interior to assume that general role. 25 U. S. C. 
§§371-380. The Secretary's responsibilities in that capacity, 
however, include the administration of the statute that the 
appellees claim is unconstitutional, see 25 U. S. C. §§ 2202, 
2209, so that he can hardly be expected to assert appellees' 
decedents' rights to the extent that they turn on that point. 
Under these circumstances, appellees can appropriately 
serve as their decedents' representatives for purposes of as-
serting the latters' Fifth Amendment rights. They are situ-
ated to pursue the claims vigorously, since their interest in 
receiving the property is indissolubly linked to the decedents' 
right to dispoRe of it by will or intestacy. A vindication of 
decedents' rights would ensure that the fractional interests 
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pass to appellees; pressing these rights unsuccessfully would 
equally guarantee that appellees take nothing. In short, 
permitting appellees to raise their decedents' claims is 
merely an extension of the common law's provision for ap-
pointment of a decedent's representative. It is therefore a 
"settled practice of the courts" not open to objection on the 
ground that it permits a litigant to raise third parties' rights. 
Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 
406 (1900). 
III 
The Congress, acting pursuant to its broad authority to 
regulate the descent and devise of Indian trust lands, Jeffer-
son v. Fink, 247 U. S. 288, 294 (1918), enacted § 207 as a 
means of ameliorating, over time, the problem of extreme 
fractionation of certain Indian lands. By forbidding the 
passing on at death of small, undivided interests in Indian 
lands, Congress hoped that future generations of Indians 
would be able to make more productive use of the Indians' 
ancestral lands. We agree with the Government that en-
couraging the consolidation of Indian lands is a public pur-
pose of high order. The fractionation problem on Indian res-
ervations is extraordinary and may call for dramatic action to 
encourage consolidation. The Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux 
Tribe, appearing as amicus curiae in support of the United 
States, is a quintessential victim of fractionation. Forty 
acre tracts on the Sisseton-Wahpeton Lake Traverse res-
ervation, leasing for about $1000 annually, are commonly 
subdivided into hundreds of undivided interests, many of 
which generate only pennies a year in rent. The average 
tract has 196 owners and the average owner undivided inter-
ests in fourteen tracts. The administrative headache this 
represents can be fathomed by examining Tract 1305, dubbed 
"one of the most fractionated parcels of land in the world." 
Lawson, Heirship: The Indian Amoeba, reprinted in Hearing 
on S. 2480 and S. 2663 BeforP the Senate Select Committee 
on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 85 (1984). Tract 
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1305 is forty acres and produces $1080 in income annually. 
It is valued at $8,000. It has 439 owners, one-third of whom 
receive less than $.05 in annual rent and two-third of whom 
receive less than $1. The largest interest holder receives 
$82.85 annually. The common denominator used to com-
pute fractional interests in the property is 3,394,923,840,000. 
The smallest heir receives $.01 every 177 years. If the tract 
were sold (assuming the 439 owners could agree) for its esti-
mated $8,000 value, he would be entitled to $.000418. The 
administrative costs of handling this tract are estimated by 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs at $17,560 annually. !d., at 86, 
87. See also Comment, Too Little Land, Too Many Heirs-
The Indian Heirship Land Problem, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 709, 
711-713 (1971). 
This Court has held that the government has considerable 
latitude in 1regulating property right~ in ways that may ad-
verse y affect e o ners. ee eystone Bituminous Coal 
Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. --, ----- (1987); 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 
U. S. 104, 125-127 (1978); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 
590, 592-593 U962). The 1~ewomfor examining the ques-
tion of whether a regulatio of property amounts to a taking 
requiring just compensation is firmly established and has 
been regularly and recently reaffirmed. See, e. g., tlCeystone 
.[Jituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S., at--; 
-/Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1004-1005 
(1984)~odel v. Virginia Surface Mini'!)~.! and Reclamation 
Assn., Inc., 4~2 U. S. 264, g95 (1981); 'Agins v. Tiburon, 447 
U. S. 255, 260-261 (1980);'1tg.iser Aetna v. United States, 444 
U. S. 164, 174-175 (1979)rf'enn Central Transportation Co. 
v. New York City, 438 U, S., at 124. As THE CHIEF Jus-
TICE has written: 
"[T]his Court has generally 'been unable to develop any 
"set formula" for determining when "justice and fair-
ness" require that economic injuries caused by public ac-
tion be compensated by the government, rather than re-
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main disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.' 
[Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 
438 U. S. 104], at 124. Rather, it has examined the 
'taking' question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, fac-
tual i~iries that have identified several f ors-such 
as th~opo~ imyact of the regu ation, it terference 
wi reasonable mvestment backed expectations, and 
th arac er of t e government ac Ion-that have par-
ticular significance. Ibid." Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U. S., at 175. 
There is no question that the relative economic impact of 
§ 207 upon the owners of. these property rights can be sub-
stantial. Section 207 provides for the escheat of small undi-
vided property interests that are- unproductive during the 
year preceding the owner's death. Even if we accept the 
Government's assertion that the income generated by such 
parcels may be properly thought of as de minimis, their 
value may not be. While the Irving estate lost two interests 
whose value together was only approximately $100, the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs placed total values of approximately 
$2,700 and $1,816 on the escheatable interests in the Cross 
and Pumpkin Seed estates. See App. 20, 21-28, 29-39. 
These are not trivial sums. There are suggestions in the leg-
islative history regarding the 1984 amendments to § 207 that 
the failure to "look back" more than one year at the income 
generated by the property had caused the escheat of poten-
tially valuable timber and mineral interests. S. Rep. 
No. 98-632, p. 12 (1984); Hearing on H. J. Res. 158 Before 
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 
2d Sess., 20, 26, 32, 75 (1984); Amendments to the Indian 
Land Consolidation Act: Hearing on H. J. Res. 158 Before 
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 
1st Sess., 8, 29 (1983). Of course, the whole of appellees' de-
cedents' property interests were not taken by§ 207. Appel-
lees' decedents retained full beneficial use of the property 
during their lifetimes as well as the right to convey it inter 
./ 
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vivos. There is no question, however, that the right to pass 
on valuable property to one's heirs is itself a valuable right. 
Depending on the age of the owner, much or most of the 
value of the parcel may inhere in this "remainder" interest. 
See 26 CFR § 20.2031-7(f) (Table A) (1986) (value of remain-
der interest when life tenant is age 65 is approximately 32% 
of the whole). 
The extent to which any of the appellees had "investment-
backed expectations" in passing on the property is dubious. 
Though it is conceivable that some of these interests were 
purchased with the expectation that the owners might pass 
on the remainder to their heirs at death, the property has 
been held in trust for the Indians for 100 years and is over-
whelmingly acquired by gift, descent, or devise. Because of 
the highly fractionated ownership, the property is generally 
held for lease rather than improved and used by the owners. 
None of the appellees here can point to any specific in-
vestment-backed expectations beyond the fact that their an-
cestors agreed to accept allotment only after ceding to 
the United States large parts of the original Great Sioux 
Reservation. 
Also weighing weakly in favor of the statute is the fact that 
there is something of an "average reciprocity of advantage," 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922), 
to the extent that owners of escheatable interests maintain a 
nexus to the Tribe. Consolidation of Indian lands in the 
Tribe benefits the members of the Tribe. All members do 
not own escheatable interests, nor do all owners belong to the 
Tribe. Nevertheless, there is substantial overlap between 
the two groups. The owners of escheatable interests often 
benefit from the escheat of others' fractional interests. 
Moreover, the whole benefit gained is greater than the sum 
of the burdens imposed since consolidated lands are more 
productive than fractionated lands. 
If we were to stop our analysis at this point, we might well 
find § 207 constitutional. But the character of the Govern-
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ment regulation here is extraordinary. In Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U. S., at 176, we emphasized that the 
regulation destroyed "one of the most essential sticks in the 
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as prop-
erty-the right to exclude others." Similarly, the regulation 
here amounts to virtually the abrogation of the right to pass 
on a certain type of property-the small undivided interest-
to one's heirs. In one form or another, the right to pass on 
property-to one's family in particular-has been part of the 
Anglo-American legal system since feudal times. See 
United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 627-628 (1896). 
The fact that it may be possible for the owners of these inter-
ests to effectively control disposition · upon death through 
complex inter vivos transactions such as revocable trusts, is 
simply not an adequate substitute for the rights taken given 
the nature of the property. Even the United States con-
cedes that total abrogation of the right to pass property is un-
precedented and likely unconstitutional. Tr. of Oral Arg. 
12-14. Moreover, this statute effectively abolishes both de-
scent and devise of these property interests even when the 
passing of the property to the heir might result in consolida-
tion of property-as for instance when the heir already owns 
another undivided interest in the property. Compare 25 
U. S.C. §2206(b) (1982 ed., Supp. III). Since the escheat-
able interests are not, as the United States argues, necessar-
ily de minimis, nor, as it also argues, does the availability of 
inter vivos transfer obviate the need for descent and devise, a 
total · se rights cannot be upheld . 
. Allar , 444 U. S. 51 (1979), this Court did '-'--...1-7'..,___ ____ ~
uphold aga st a aking" claim a re~l~ion prohibiting the 
sale of eagles and eagle parts, whether legally acquired or 
otherwise, in order to conserve the dwindling populations of 
these birds. To be sure, in t e bundle of rights that make up 
ownership, the right of sale is of comparable importance to 
the right to have the property pass on death. As in Allard, 
appellees' decedents here retained the right to possess, use, 
,, 
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exclude and donate the property, id., at 66; the extent of 
what is taken here in comparison to the rights left untouched 
is similar. But Allard depends at least in part on the unique 
characteristics of the property at issue in that case. Prohi-
bition of the sale of existing legally obtained artifacts was 
nece~~~ inc~ntiv~to poach since "there is no 
sure means by which to determine the age of bird feathers; 
feathers recently taken can easily be passed off as having 
been obtained long ago." Id., at 58. Moreover, the pay-
ment of just compensation was not an available alternative in 
Allard; owners of illegally obtained feathers may have been 
happy to tender them to the government in return for com-
pensation. Poaching, therefore, might have remained prof-
itable absent an uncompensated prohibition against sale. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that the Government ac-
complished its objective in this case by reallocating prop~y 
rights in the land and concentrating ownership in the Tribe. 
By ~e Act in Allard prevented the sale of property 
but did not otherwise reallocate the owners' rights. For all 
these reasons, then, Allard does not control the disposition of 
this case. -.-"" - ...._, =-
In holding that complete abolition of both the descent and 
devise of a particular class of property may be a taking, we 
reaffirm the continuing vitality of the long line of cases 
recognizing the States', and where appropriate, the United 
States', broad authority to adjust the rules governing the 
descent and devise of property without implicating the guar-
antees of the Just Compensation Clause. See, e. g., Irving 
Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U. S. 556, 562 (1942); Jefferson v. 
Fink, 247 U. S., at 294. The difference in this case is the 
fact that both descent and devise are completely abolished; 
indeed they are abolished even in circumstances when the 
governmental purpose sought to be advanced, consolidation 
of ownership of Indian lands, does not conflict with the 
further descent of the property. 
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There is little doubt that the extreme fractionation of In-
dian lands is a serious public problem. It may well be appro-
priate for the United States to ameliorate fractionation by 
means of regulating the descent and devise of Indian lands. 
Surely it is permissible for the United States to prevent the 
owners of such interests from further subdividing them 
among future heirs on pain of escheat. See Texaco, Inc. v. 
Short, 454 U. S. 516, 542 (1982) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 
It may be appropriate to minimize further compounding of 
the problem by abolishing the descent of such interests by 
rules of intestacy, thereby forcing the owners to formally 
designate an heir to prevent escheat to the Tribe. What is 
certainly not appropriate is to take the extraordinary step of 
abolishing both descent and devise of these property inter-
ests even when the passing of the property to the heir might 
result in consolidation of property. Accordingly, we find 
that this regulation, in the words of Justice Holmes, "goes 
too far." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S., at 
415. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-637 
DONALD P. HODEL, SECRETARY OF THE 
INTERIOR, APPELLANT v. 
MARY IRVING ET AL. . 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1987] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether the original version 
of the "escheat" provision of the Indian Land Consolidation 
Act of 1983, Pub. L. 97-459, Tit. II, 96 Stat. 2519, effected 
a "taking" of appellees' decedents' property without just 
compensation. 
I 
Towards the end of the 19th century, Congress enacted a 
series of land Acts which divided the communal reservations 
of Indian tribes into individual allotments for Indians and 
unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement. This legislation 
seems to have been in part animated by a desire to force Indi-
ans to abandon their nomadic ways in order to "speed the In-
dians' assimilation into American society," Solem v. Bartlett, 
465 U. S. 463, 466 (1984), and in part a result of pressure to 
free new lands for further white settlement. Ibid. Two 
years after the enactment of the General Allotment Act of 
1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 et seq., Congress adopted a specific 
statute authorizing the division of the Great Reservation of 
the Sioux Nation into separate reservations and the allot-
ment of specific tracts of reservation land to individual 
Indians, conditioned on the consent of three-fourths of the 
adult male Sioux. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888 
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et seq. Under the Act, each male Sioux head of household 
took 320 acres of land and most other individuals 160 acres. 
25 Stat. 890. In order to protect the allottees from the 
improvident disposition of their lands to white settlers, the 
Sioux allotment statute provided that the allotted lands were 
to be held in trust by the United States. 25 Stat. 891. 
Until 1910 the lands of deceased allottees passed to their 
heirs "according to the laws of the State or Territory" where 
the land was located, ibid, and after 1910, allottees were 
permitted to dispose of their interests by will in accordance 
with regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior. 25 U. S. C. § 373. Those regulations generally served 
to protect Indian ownership of the allotted lands. 
The policy of allotment of Indian lands quickly proved di-
sastrous for the Indians. Cash generated by land sales to 
whites was quickly dissipated and the Indians, rather than 
farm the land themselves, evolved into petty landlords, leas-
ing their allotted lands to white ranchers and farmers and liv-
ing off the meager rentals. Lawson, Heirship: The Indian 
Amoeba, reprinted in Hearing on S. 2480 and S. 2663 Before 
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Gong., 
2d Sess., 82-83 (1984). The failure of the allotment program 
became even clearer as successive generations came to hold 
the allotted lands. Forty, eighty and 160 acre parcels be-
came splintered into multiple undivided interests in land, 
with some parcels having hundreds and many parcels having 
dozens of owners. Because the land was held in trust and 
often could not be alienated or partitioned the fractionation 
problem grew and grew over time. 
A 1928 report commissioned by the Congress found the 
situation administratively unworkable and economically 
wasteful. L. Meriam, Ins~itute for Government Research, 
The Problem of Indian Administration 40-41 (1928). Good, 
potentially productive, land was allowed to lie fallow, amidst 
great poverty, because of the difficulties of managing prop-
erty held in this manner. Hearings on H. R. 11113 Before 
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the House Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the House Comm. 
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 
(1966) (remarks of Rep. Aspinall). In discussing the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, Representative Howard said: 
"It is in the case of the inherited allotments, however, 
that the administrative costs become incredible .... 
On allotted reservations, numerous cases exist where 
the shares of each individual heir from lease money may 
be 1 cent a month. Or one heir may own minute frac-
tional shares in 30 or 40 different allotments. The cost 
of leasing, bookkeeping, and distributing the proceeds in 
many cases far exceeds the total income. The Indians 
and the Indian Service personnel are thus trapped in a 
meaningless system of minute partition in which all 
thought of the possible use of land to satisfy human 
needs is lost in a mathematical haze of bookkeeping." 
78 Cong. Rec. 11728 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Howard). 
In 1934, in response to arguments such as these, the Con-
gress acknowledged the failure of its policy and ended further 
allotment of Indian lands. Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461. 
But the end of future allotment by itself could not prevent 
the further compounding of the existing problem caused by 
the passage of time. Ownership continued to fragment as 
succeeding generations came to hold the property, since, in 
the order of things, each property owner was apt to have 
more than one heir. In 1960, both the House and the Senate 
undertook comprehensive studies of the problem. See 
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong., 2d 
Sess., Indian Heirship Land Survey (Comm. Print 1960); 
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong., 
2d Sess., Indian Heirship Land Survey (Comm. Print 1960). 
These studies indicated that one-half of the approximately 12 
million acres of allotted trust lands were held in fractionated 
ownership, with over 3 million acres held by more than six 
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heirs to a parcel. I d., at x (Part 2). Further hearings were 
held in 1966, Indian Fractionated Land Problems: Hearings 
on H. R. 11113 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the 
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1966), but not until Indian Land Consolidation Act 
of 1983 did the Congress take action to ameliorate the prob- · 
lem of fractionated ownership of Indian lands. 
Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act-the 
escheat provision at issue in this case-provided: 
"No undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust 
or restricted land within a tribe's reservation or other-
wise subjected to a tribe's jurisdiction shall descedent 
[sic] by intestacy or devise but shall escheat to that tribe 
if such interest represents 2 per centum or less of the 
total acreage in such tract and has earned to its owner 
less than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to 
escheat." 96 Stat. 2519. 
Congress made no provision for the payment of compensation 
to the owners of the interests covered by § 207. The statute 
was signed into law on January 12, 1983 and became effective 
immediately. 
The three appellees-Mary Irving, Patrick Pumpkin Seed, 
and Eileen Bisonette-are enrolled members of the Oglala 
Sioux Tribe. They are, or represent, heirs or devisees of 
members of the Tribe who died in March, April and June 
1983. Eileen Bisonette's decedent, Mary Poor Bear-Little 
Hoop Cross, purported to will all her property, including 
property subject to § 207, to her five minor children in whose 
name Bisonette claims the property. Chester Irving, 
Charles Leroy Pumpkin Seed, and Edgar Pumpkin Seed all 
died intestate. At the time of their deaths, the four dece~ 
-dents owned 41 fractional interests subject to the provisions 
of § 207. App. 20, 22-28, 32-33, 37-39. The Irving estate 
lost two interests whose value together was approximately 
$100; the Bureau of Indian Affairs placed total values of ap-
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proximately $2,700 on the 26 escheatable interests in the 
Cross estate and $1,816 on the 13 escheatable interests in the 
Pumpkin Seed estates. But for § 207, this property would 
have passed, in the ordinary course, to appellees or those 
they represent. 
Appellees filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the District of South Dakota, claiming that § 207 resulted in a 
taking of property without just compensation in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment. The District Court concluded that 
the statute was constitutional. It held that appellees had no 
vested interest in the property of the decedents prior to their 
deaths and that Congress had plenary authority to abolish 
the power of testamentary disposition of Indian property and 
to alter the rules of intestate succession. App. to Juris. 
Statement 21a-26a. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 
758 F. 2d 1260. Although it agreed that the appellees had no 
vested rights in the decedents' property, it concluded that 
their decedents had a right, derived from the original Sioux 
Allotment Statute, to control disposition of their property at 
death. The Court of Appeals held that the appellees had 
standing to invoke that right and that the taking of that right 
without compensation to decedents' estates violated the Fifth 
Amendment. 1 
II 
The Court of Appeals concluded that appellees have 
standing to challenge §207. 758 F. 2d, at 1267-1268. The 
Government does not contest this ruling. As the Court of 
Appeals recognized, however, the existence of a case or con-
'The Court of Appeals, without explanation, went on to "declare" that 
not only the original version of§ 207, but also the amended version not be-
fore it, 25 U. S. C. § 2206, unconstitutionally took property without com-
pensation. Since none of the property which escheated in this case did so 
pursuant to the amended version of the statute, this "declaration" is, at 
best, dicta. We express no opinion on the constitutionality of § 207 as 
amended. 
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troversy is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's 
deliberations. I d., at 1267 n. 12. We are satisfied that the 
necessary case or controversy exists in this case. Section 
207 has deprived appellees of the fractional interests they 
otherwise would have inherited. This is sufficient injury-in-
fact to satisfy Article III of the Constitution. See Singleton 
v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 112 (1976). 
In addition to the constitutional standing requirements, we 
have recognized prudential standing limitations. As the 
court below recognized, one of these prudential principles is 
that the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights 
and interests. 758 F. 2d, at 1267-1268. That general prin-
ciple, however, is subject to exceptions. Appellees here do 
not assert that their own property rights have been taken un-
constitutionally, but rather that their decedents' right to pass 
the property at death has been taken. Nevertheless, we 
have no difficulty in finding the concerns of the prudential 
standing doctrine met here. 
For obvious reasons, it has long been recognized that the 
surviving claims of a decedent must be pursued by a third 
party. At common law, a decedent's surviving claims were 
prosecuted by the executor or administrator of the estate. 
For Indians with trust property, statutes require the Secre-
tary of the Interior to assume that general role. 25 U. S. C. 
§§ 371-380. The Secretary's responsibilities in that capacity, 
however, include the administration of the statute that the 
appellees claim is unconstitutional, see 25 U. S. C. §§ 2202, 
2209, so that he can hardly be expected to assert appellees' 
decedents' rights to the extent that they turn on that point. 
Under these circumstances, appellees can appropriately 
serve as their decedents' representatives for purposes of as-
serting the latters' Fifth Amendment rights. They are situ-
ated to pursue the claims vigorously, since their interest in 
receiving the property is indissolubly linked to the decedents' 
right to dispose of it by will or intestacy. A vindication of 
decedents' rights would ensure that the fractional interests 
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pass to appellees; pressing these rights unsuccessfully would 
equally guarantee that appellees take nothing. In short, 
permitting appellees to raise their decedents' claims is 
merely an extension of the common law's provision for ap-
pointment of a decedent's representative. It is therefore a 
"settled practice of the courts" not open to objection on the 
ground that it permits a litigant to raise third parties' rights. 
Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 
406 (1900). 
III 
The Congress, acting pursuant to its broad authority to 
regulate the descent and devise of Indian trust lands, Jeffer-
son v. Fink, 247 U. S. 288, 294 (1918), enacted § 207 as a 
means of ameliorating, over time, the problem of extreme 
fractionation of certain Indian lands. By forbidding the 
passing on at death of small, undivided interests in Indian 
lands, Congress hoped that future generations of Indians 
would be able to make more productive use of the Indians' 
ancestral lands. We agree with the Government that en-
couraging the consolidation of Indian lands is a public pur-
pose of high order. The fractionation problem on Indian 
reservations is extraordinary and may call for dramatic ac-
tion to encourage consolidation. The Sisseton-Wahpeton 
Sioux Tribe, appearing as amicus curiae in support of the 
United States, is a quintessential victim of fractionation. 
Forty acre tracts on the Sisseton-Wahpeton Lake Traverse 
reservation, leasing for about $1000 annually, are commonly 
subdivided into hundreds of undivided interests, many of 
which generate only pennies a year in rent. The average 
tract has 196 owners and the average owner undivided inter-
ests in fourteen tracts. The administrative headache this 
represents can be fathomed by examining Tract 1305, dubbed 
"one of the most fractionated parcels of land in the world." 
Lawson, Heirship: The Indian Amoeba, reprinted in Hearing 
on S. 2480 and S. 2663 Before the Senate Select Committee 
on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 85 (1984). Tract 
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1305 is forty acres and produces $1080 in income annually. 
It is valued at $8,000. It has 439 owners, one-third of whom 
receive less than $.05 in annual rent and two-third of whom 
receive less than $1. The largest interest holder receives 
$82.85 annually. The common denominator used to com-
pute fractional interests in the property is 3,394,923,840,000. 
The smallest heir receives $. 01 every 177 years. If the tract 
were sold (assuming the 439 owners could agree) for its esti-
mated $8,000 value, he would be entitled to $.000418. The 
administrative costs of handling this tract are estimated by 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs at $17,560 annually. !d., at 86, 
87. See also Comment, Too Little Land, Too Many Heirs-
The Indian Heirship Land Problem, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 709, 
711-713 (1971). 
This Court has held that the government has considerable 
latitude in regulating property rights in ways that may ad-
versely affect the owners. See Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. 8. --, ----- (1987); 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 
U. S. 104, 125-127 (1978); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. 8. 
590, 592-593 (1962). The framework for examining the ques-
tion of whether a regulation of property amounts to a taking 
requiring just compensation is firmly established and has 
been regularly and recently reaffirmed. See, e. g., Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S., at--; 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1004-1005 
(1984); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation 
Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 295 (1981); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 
U. S. 255, 260-261 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 
U. S. 164, 174-175 (1979); Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. New York City, 438 U. S., at 124. As THE CHIEF Jus-
TICE has written: 
"[T]his Court has generally 'been unable to develop any 
"set formula" for determining when "justice and fair-
ness" require that economic injuries caused by public ac-
tion be compensated by the government, rather than re-
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main disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.' 
[Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 
438 U. S. 104], at 124. Rather, it has examined the 
'taking' question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, fac-
tual inquiries that have identified several factors-such 
as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference 
with reasonable investment backed expectations, and 
the character of the government action-that have par-
ticular significance. Ibid." Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U. S., at 175. 
There is no question that the relative economic impact of 
§ 207 upon the owners of these property rights can be sub-
stantial. Section 207 provides for the escheat of small undi-
vided property interests that are unproductive during the 
year preceding the owner's death. Even if we accept the 
Government's assertion that the income generated by such 
parcels may be properly thought of as de minimis, their 
value may not be. While the Irving estate lost two interests 
whose value together was only approximately $100, the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs placed total values of approximately 
$2,700 and $1,816 on the escheatable interests in the Cross 
and Pumpkin Seed estates. See App. 20, 21-28, 29-39. 
These are not trivial sums. There are suggestions in the leg-
islative history regarding the 1984 amendments to § 207 that 
the failure to "look back" more than one year at the income 
generated by the property had caused the escheat of poten-
tially valuable timber and mineral interests. S. Rep. 
No. 98-632, p. 12 (1984); Hearing on H. J. Res. 158 Before 
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 
2d Sess., 20, 26, 32, 75 (1984); Amendments to the Indian 
Land Consolidation Act: Hearing on H. J. Res. 158 Before 
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 
1st Sess., 8, 29 (1983). Of course, the whole of appellees' de-
cedents' property interests were not taken by§ 207. Appel-
lees' decedents retained full beneficial use of the property 
during their lifetimes as well as the right to convey it inter 
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vivos. There is no question, however, that the right to pass 
on valuable property to one's heirs is itself a valuable right. 
Depending on the age of the owner, much or most of the 
value of the parcel may inhere in this "remainder" interest. 
See 26 CFR § 20.2031-7(0 (Table A) (1986) (value of remain-
der interest when life tenant is age 65 is approximately 32% 
of the whole). 
The extent to which any of the appellees had "investment-
backed expectations" in passing on the property is dubious. 
Though it is conceivable that some of these interests were 
purchased with the expectation that the owners might pass 
on the remainder to their heirs at death, the property has 
been held in trust for the Indians for 100 years and is over-
whelmingly acquired by gift, descent, or devise. Because of 
the highly fractionated ownership, the property is generally 
held for lease rather than improved and used by the owners. 
None of the appellees here can point to any specific in-
vestment-backed expectations beyond the fact that their an-
cestors agreed to accept allotment only after ceding to 
the United States large parts of the original Great Sioux 
Reservation. 
Also weighing weakly in favor of the statute is the fact that 
there is something of an "average reciprocity of advantage," 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922), 
to the extent that owners of escheatable interests maintain a 
nexus to the Tribe. Consolidation of Indian lands in the 
Tribe benefits the members of the Tribe. All members do 
not own escheatable interests, nor do all owners belong to the 
Tribe. Nevertheless, there is substantial overlap between 
the two groups. The owners of escheatable interests often 
benefit from the escheat of others' fractional interests. 
Moreover, the whole benefit gained is greater than the sum 
of the burdens imposed since consolidated lands are more 
productive than fractionated lands. 
If we were to stop our analysis at this point, we might well 
find § 207 constitutional. But the character of the Govern-
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ment regulation here is extraordinary. In Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U. S., at 176, we emphasized that the 
regulation destroyed "one of the most essential sticks in the 
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as prop-
erty-the right to exclude others." Similarly, the regulation 
here amounts to virtually the abrogation of the right to pass 
on a certain type of property-the small undivided interest-
to one's heirs. In one form or another, the right to pass on 
property-to one's family in particular-has been part of the 
Anglo-American legal system since feudal times. See 
United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 627-628 (1896). 
The fact that it may be possible for the owners of these inter-
ests to effectively control disposition upon death through 
complex inter vivos transactions such as revocable trusts, is 
simply not an adequate substitute for the rights taken given 
the nature of the property. Even the United States con-
cedes that total abrogation of the right to pass property is un-
precedented and likely unconstitutional. Tr. of Oral Arg. 
12-14. Moreover, this statute effectively abolishes both de-
scent and devise of these property interests even when the 
passing of the property to the heir might result in consolida-
tion of property-as for instance when the heir already owns 
another undivided interest in the property. 2 Compare 25 
2JUSTICE STEVENS argues that weighing in the balance the fact that 
§ 207 takes the right to pass property even when descent or devise results 
in consolidation of Indian lands amounts to an unprecedented importation 
of overbreadth analysis into our Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. Post, 
at --. The basis for this argument is his assertion that none of appel-
lees'-decedents actually attempted to pass the property in a way that might 
have resulted in consolidation. But the fact of the matter remains that 
before § 207 was enacted appellees' decedents had the power to pass on 
their property at death to those who already owned an interest in the sub-
ject property. This right too was abrogated by § 207; each of the appel-
lees' decedents lost this stick in their bundles of property rights upon the 
enactment of § 207. It is entirely proper to note the extent of the rights 
taken from appellees' decedents in assessing whether the statute passes 
constitutional muster under the Penn Central balancing test. This is nei-
ther overbreadth analysis nor novel. See, e. g., Keystone Bituminous 
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U.S. C. §2206(b) (1982 ed., Supp. III). Since the escheat-
able interests are not, as the United States argues, necessar-
ily de minimis, nor, as it also argues, does the availability of 
inter vivos transfer obviate the need for descent and devise, a 
total abrogation of these rights cannot be upheld. 
In Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51 (1979), this Court did 
uphold against a "taking" claim a regulation prohibiting the 
sale of eagles and eagle parts, whether legally acquired or 
otherwise, in order to conserve the dwindling populations of 
these birds. To be sure, in the bundle of rights that make up 
ownership, the right of sale is of comparable importance to 
the right to have the property pass on death. As in Allard, 
appellees' decedents here retained the right to possess, use, 
exclude and donate the property, id., at 66; the extent of 
what is taken here in comparison to the rights left untouched 
is similar. But Allard depends at least in part on the unique 
characteristics of the property at issue in that case. Prohi-
bition of the sale of existing legally obtained artifacts was 
necessary to remove the incentive to poach since "there is no 
sure means by which to determine the age of bird feathers; 
feathers recently taken can easily be passed off as having 
been obtained long ago." ld., at 58. Moreover, the pay-
ment of just compensation was not an available alternative in 
Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis,-- U. S., at--; 107 S. Ct., at 1248-1249 
(discussing, in general terms, the extent of the abrogation of coal extrac-
tion rights caused by the Subsidence Act); Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 136-137 (discussing extent to which 
air rights abrogated by the designation of Grand Central Station as a land-
mark, noting that not all new construction prohibited, and noting the avail-
ability of transferable development rights). 
JUSTICE STEVENS' objections are perhaps better directed at the question 
of whether there is third-party standing to challenge this statute under the 
Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause. But as we have shown, 
there is certainly no Article III bar to permitting the appellees to raise 
their decedents claims, supra, at--, and JUSTICE STEVENS himself con-
cedes that prudential considerations do not bar consideration of the Fifth 
Amendment claim. Post , at --. 
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Allard; owners of illegally obtained feathers may have been 
happy to tender them to the government in return for com-
pensation. Poaching, therefore, might have remained prof-
itable absent an uncompensated prohibition against sale. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that the Government ac-
complished its objective in this case by reallocating property 
rights in the land and con~entrating ownership in the Tribe. 
By contrast, the Act in Allard prevented the sale of property 
but did not otherwise reallocate the owners' rights. For all 
these reasons, then, Allard does not control the disposition of 
this case. 
In holding that complete abolition of both the descent and 
devise of a particular class of property may be a taking, we 
reaffirm the continuing vitality of the long line of cases 
recognizing the States', and where appropriate, the United 
States', broad authority to adjust the rules governing the 
descent and devise of property without implicating the guar-
antees of the Just Compensation Clause. See, e. g., Irving 
Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U. S. 556, 562 (1942); Jefferson v. 
Fink, 247 U. S., at 294. The difference in this case is the 
fact that both descent and devise are completely abolished; 
indeed they are abolished even in circumstances when the 
governmental purpose sought to be advanced, consolidation 
of ownership of Indian lands, does not conflict with the 
further descent of the property. 
There is little doubt that the extreme fractionation of In-
dian lands is a serious public problem. It may well be appro-
priate for the United States to ameliorate fractionation by 
means of regulating the descent and devise of Indian lands. 
Surely it is permissible for the United States to prevent the 
owners of such interests from further subdividing them 
among future heirs on pain of escheat. See Texaco, Inc. v. 
Short, 454 U.S. 516, 542 (1982) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 
It may be appropriate to minimize further compounding of 
the problem by abolishing the descent of such interests by 
rules of intestacy, thereby forcing the owners to formally 
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designate an heir to prevent escheat to the Tribe. What is 
certainly not appropriate is to take the extraordinary step of 
abolishing both descent and devise of these property inter-
ests even when the passing of the property to the heir might 
result in consolidation of property. Accordingly, we find 
that this regulation, in the words of Justice Holmes, "goes 
too far." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. 8., at 








From: Justice Scalia 
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-637 
DONALD P. HODEL, SECRETARY OF THE INTE-
RIOR, APPELLANT v. MARY IRVING ET AL. 
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JUSTICE ScALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment. 
I join JUSTICE O'CONNOR's opinion, with the exception of 
its proposed distinction of Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51 
(1979). Ante, at--. Since the opinion acknowledges that 
"the extent of what is taken here in comparison to the rights 
left untouched is similar" to the balance in Allard, ante, at 
--; and since that comparison is, under our established case 
law, determinative of whether there has been a taking, see 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 
U. S. 104, 136 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U. S. 393, 413 (1922); I believe we should recognize that we 
have limited Allard to its facts. - _ 
JuSTICE O'CONNOR's opinion pr~pose~~stinctions of 
Allard. It notes, first· that "prohibition of the sale of ex-
isting legally obtain~rtifacts was necessary to remove the 
incentive to poach," and, ~. that ''[t~ of 
justcompen8ation was not an available alternative." Ante, 
at --. Both these distinctions rest upon the premise that 
the government may take property without just compen-
sation if only its need to do so is _S!eat enough. That is 
directly~thhangl.uigeof the Fifth Amendment, 
which states "nor shall private property be taken for public 
use without just compensation." It is also inconsistent with 
our prior case law on the takings clause, which, as JusTICE 
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STEVENS correctly notes, has assumed that "[t]he legitimacy 
of the governmental purposes served by" the statute at issue 
does not "excuse or mitigate whatever obligation to pay just 
compensation is imposed by the Constitution." Ante, at 
The Penn Central inquiry is, to be sure, a balancing 
test, but it seems to me that JusTICE O'CONNOR's 1stinction 
OfAllard mistakes the object of the inquiry and therefore 
misidentifies the interests to be balanced. The object of the 
inquiry is to determine whether, despite the government's 
claim that it has merely exercised its police power, it has in 
fact "taken" property and is thus required to proceed through 
the eminent domain power. Whether property has been 
"taken" is determined by balancing what the governmental 
action withdraws from the property owner against what it 
leaves him. In distinguishing Allard, however, JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR instead balances the governmental i!!j,erest in the 
regulation against lhe ow · er'S interest in bemg free o 1t, an 
approach which is to my knowledge unprecedented. 
The third ground of distinction proposed by JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR's opinion is that "it is important to recognize that 
the Government accomplished its objective in this case by re-
allocating property rights in the land and concentrating own-
ership in the Tribe," ante, at --. This distinguishes the 
regulatory takings analysis of Allard only by calling into 
question whether the present case is appropriate for regula-
tory takings analysis at all. To date we have applied the 
regulatory takings approach only to laws that have an inci-
dental effect on property rights, but whose primary purpose 
is not to reallocate property. We have never applied ir to 
governmental action that does not merely incidentally affect 
private property in the course of pursuing a separate regula-
tory purpose, but that has as its very object the transfer of 
property ownership. The latter is the kind of governmental 
action we confront here. The present statute does not seek 
to further the public health, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 
623, 668-669 (1887), preserve historically significant struc-
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tures, Penn Central, supra, at 132, or prevent the destruc-
tion of a valuable national resource, Allard, supra, at 53. 
Rather, as the Secretary explains, its purpose is to create a 
new structure of ownership of land interests that Congress 
believes will be more beneficial to Indians. Brief for Appel-
lants 9-10. 
While we held in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 
467 U. S. 229 (1984), that transferring the private ownership 
of property can be a "public purpose" for which the eminent 
domain power may be used, we assuredly did not hold that 
Congress could pursue that purpose by regulation, instead of 
through eminent domain. To the contrary, our holding that 
the law was constitutional was expressly conditioned on the 
"assum[ption] . . . that the weighty demand of just com-
pensation has been met." I d., at 245. See also Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, -- U. S. --
(1987) (the purpose of the action is critical in assessing 
whether the government is required to proceed by eminent 
domain). This question of whether a law whose purpose and 
effect is to transfer ownership necessarily involves the use of 
the eminent domain power is, it seems to me, the only point 
to which the suggested third distinction of Allard is relevant. 
I do not see how the fact that a statute transfers ownership 
has anything to do with Penn Central's balancing of rights 
taken versus rights retained-or even, for that matter, with 
the newly asserted criterion of whether the government has 
a pressing need to take the property. If ownership transfer 
has any relevance, it is to suggest that not only Allard but 
Penn Central, supra, Pennsylvania Coal, supra, and our en-
tire regulatory takings jurisprudence have no proper bearing 
upon the resolution of this case. I nonetheless do not rely on 
that ground, since I share the view that, even analysed as a 
regulatory taking, this statute "goes too far," see Pennsylva-
nia Coal, supra, at 415. I think it important to acknowl-
edge, however, that we reach that conclusion notwithstand-
ing Allard. 
May 4, 1987 
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Dear Chief: 
This refers to our recent discussion of this cas~. 
I enclose a draft of a pronosed letter to Nino. I 
have not delivered the letter, as t would like to have the 
benefit of your views. 
Si. ncerely, 
The Chjef Justice 
lfp/ss 
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Dear Nino: 
I find myself in an uncomfortable posture as a re-
sult of the substantial chanqes in vour opinion and 
Sandra's. It is constructive that you and she reached 
agreement except with respect to the proper tnterpretation 
of the Court's decision in Andr.us v. ~llard. 
That was a unanimous decision of the Court and my 
view of it i.s closer to Sandra's than to yours. In Andrus 
the government i.nterest in preventing the extinctlon of the 
eagles probably could not have been furthered in any other 
w~.y. Although Andrus has been cited in several taking 
cases, !t could have been distinguished in each of them. As 
I vlew it, Andrus simply is not in the "mai.n stream" of tak-
ing clause analysis. 
I am concerned, however, because I did ioin your 
original circulation that i.ncluded essentially what you have 
retalned with respect to Andrus. The focus of your draft, 
however, was not then on Andrus. ~or had I seen Sandra's 
present draft that reflects your substantial contributions 
to it. 
This is a constitutional case, and of course it is 
desirable to have a Court opinion. In my view the discus-
sion of Andrus is not necessary in th:is case, and could be 
omitted from both opinions. 
I have worried about this for a week or more, as I 
have been reluctant to change a vote even \.'there there have 
been substantial changes in the pertinent opinions. I am 
sending a copy of this to the Ch ie·f Just lee as he and I have 
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I find myself in an uncomfortable posture as a re-~
sult of the substantial changes in your opinion and ~<?~·~~ 
Sandra's. It is constructive that you and she reached ~ ~ 
agreement except with respect to the proper interpretation
of the Court's decision in Andrus v. Allard. ·~ ~ 
That was a unanimous decision of the Court and my ~ 
view of it is closer to Sandra's than to yours. In Andrus ~/­
the government interest in preventing the extinction of the 
eagles probably could not have been furthered in any other ~44 ~A~ 
way. Although Andrus has been cited in several taking ~<::'_,j..-')1-
cases, it could have been distinguished in each of them. As ~ ~ 
I view it, Andrus simply is not in the "main stream" of tak-
ing clause analysis. ~ 
I am concerned, however, because I did join your 
original circulation that included essentially what you have 
retained with respect to Andrus. The focus of your draft, 
however, was not then on Andrus. Nor had I seen Sandra's 
present draft that reflects your substantial contributions 
to it. 
This is a constitutional case, and of course it is 
desirable to have a Court opinion. In my view the discus-
sion of Andrus is not necessary in this case, and could be 
omitted from both opinions. 
I have worried about this for a week or more, as I 
have been reluctant to change a vote even where there have 
been substantial changes in the pertinent opinions. I am 
sending a copy of this to the Chief Justice as he and I have 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ~ 
No. 85-637 
DONALD P. HODEL, SECRETARY OF THE INTE- q 
RIOR, APPELLANT v. MARY IRVING ET AL. / 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS r 
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[May-, 1987] ~ 
JusTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether the original version 
of the "escheat" provision of the Indian Land Consolidation ~ ... 
Act of 1983, Pub. L. 97-459, Tit. II, 96 Stat. 2519, effected 
a "taking" of appellees' decedents' property without just _ ,# , _. 
compensation. ~~ 1 
I 
Towards the end of the 19th century, Congress enacted a 
series of land Acts which divided the communal reservations 
of Indian tribes into individual allotments for Indians and 
unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement. This legislation 
seems to have been in part animated by a desire to force Indi-
ans to abandon their nomadic ways in order to "speed the In-
dians' assimilation into American society," Solem v. Bartlett, 
465 U. S. 463, 466 (1984), and in part a result of pressure to 
free new lands for further white settlement. Ibid. Two 
years after the enactment of the General Allotment Act of 
1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, Congress adopted a specific stat-
ute authorizing the division of the Great Reservation of the 
Sioux Nation into separate reservations and the allotment of 
specific tracts of reservation land to individual Indians, con-
ditioned on the consent of three-fourths of the adult male 
Sioux. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888. Under 
the Act, each male Sioux head of household took 320 acres of 
-
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land and most other individuals 160 acres. 25 Stat. 890. In 
order to protect the allottees from the improvident dispo-
sition of their lands to white settlers, the Sioux allotment 
statute provided that the allotted lands were to be held in 
trust by the United States. 25 Stat. 891. Until 1910 the 
lands of deceased allottees passed to their heirs "according 
to the laws of the State or Territory" where the land was 
located, ibid, and after 1910, allottees were permitted to 
dispose of their interests by will in accordance with regula-
tions promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior. 36 Stat. 
856, 25 U. S. C. § 373. Those regulations generally served 
to protect Indian ownership of the allotted lands. 
The policy of allotment of Indian lands quickly proved 
disastrous for the Indians. Cash generated by land sales to 
whites was quickly dissipated and the Indians, rather than 
farm the land themselves, evolved into petty landlords, leas-
ing their allotted lands to white ranchers and farmers and liv-
ing off the meager rentals. Lawson, Heirship: The Indian 
Amoeba, reprinted in Hearing on S. 2480 and S. 2663 before 
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 
2d Sess., 82-83 (1984). The failure of the allotment program 
became even clearer as successive generations came to hold 
the allotted lands. Forty- eighty- and 160-acre parcels be-
came splintered into multiple undivided interests in land, 
with some parcels having hundreds and many parcels having 
dozens of owners. Because the land was held in trust and 
often could not be alienated or partitioned the fractionation 
problem grew and grew over time. 
A 1928 report commissioned by the Congress found the 
situation administratively unworkable and economically 
wasteful. L. Meriam, Institute for Government Research, 
The Problem of Indian Administration 40~41. Good, poten-
tially productive, land was allowed to lie fallow, amidst great 
poverty, because of the difficulties of managing property held 
in this manner. Hearings on H. R. 11113 before the Sub-
committee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on In-
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terior and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1966) 
(remarks of Rep. Aspinall). In discussing the Indian Re-
organization Act of 1934, Representative Howard said: 
"It is in the case of the inherited allotments, however, 
that the administrative costs become incredible. . . . On 
allotted reservations, numerous cases exist where the 
shares of each individual heir from lease money may be 1 
cent a month. Or one heir may own minute fractional 
shares in 30 or 40 different allotments. The cost of leas-
ing, bookkeeping, and distributing the proceeds in many 
cases far exceeds the total income. The Indians and the 
Indian Service personnel are thus trapped in a meaning-
less system of minute partition in which all thought of 
the possible use of land to satisfy human needs is lost 
in a mathematical haze of bookkeeping." 78 Cong. Rec. 
11728 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Howard). 
In 1934, in response to arguments such as these, the Con-
gress acknowledged the failure of its policy and ended further 
allotment of Indian lands. Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. §461 et seq. 
But the end of future allotment by itself could not prevent 
the further compounding of the existing problem caused by 
the passage of time. Ownership continued to fragment as 
succeeding generations came to hold the property, since, 
in the order of things, each property owner was apt to have 
more than one heir. In 1960, both the House and the Sen-
ate undertook comprehensive studies of the problem. See 
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Indian 
Heirship Land Study, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 
1961); Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, In-
dian Heirship Land Survey, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. 
Print 1961). These studies indicated that one-half of the 
approximately 12 million acres of allotted trust lands were 
held in fractionated ownership, with over three million acres 
held by more than six heirs to a parcel. I d., at pt. 2, p. x. 
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Further hearings were held in 1966, Hearings on H. R. 
11113, supra, but not until the Indian Land Consolidation 
Act of 1983 did the Congress take action to ameliorate the 
problem of fractionated ownership of Indian lands. 
Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act-the es-
cheat provision at issue in this case-provided: 
"No undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust 
or restricted land within a tribe's reservation or other-
wise subjected to a tribe's jurisdiction shall descedent 
[sic] by intestacy or devise but shall escheat to that tribe 
if such interest represents 2 per centum or less of the 
total acreage in such tract and has earned to its owner 
less than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to 
escheat." 96 Stat. 2519. 
Congress made no provision for the payment of compensation 
to the owners of the interests covered by§ 207. The statute 
was signed into law on January 12, 1983 and became effective 
immediately. 
The three appellees-Mary Irving, Patrick Pumpkin Seed, 
and Eileen Bisonette-are enrolled members of the Oglala 
Sioux Tribe. They are, or represent, heirs or devisees of 
members of the Tribe who died in March, April and June 
1983. Eileen Bisonette's decedent, Mary Poor Bear-Little 
Hoop Cross, purported to will all her property, including 
property subject to § 207, to her five minor children in whose 
name Bisonette claims the property. Chester Irving, 
Charles Leroy Pumpkin Seed, and Edgar Pumpkin Seed all 
died intestate. At the time of their deaths, the four dece-
dents owned 41 fractional interests subject to the provisions 
of § 207. App. 20, 22-28, 32-33, 37-39. The Irving estate 
lost two interests whose value together was approximately 
$100; the Bureau of Indian Affairs placed total values of 
approximately $2,700 on the 26 escheatable interests in the 
Cross estate and $1,816 on the 13 escheatable interests in the 
Pumpkin Seed estates. But for § 207, this property would 
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have passed, in the ordinary course, to appellees or those 
they represent. 
Appellees filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the District of South Dakota, claiming that § 207 resulted in a 
taking of property without just compensation in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment. The District Court concluded that 
the statute was constitutional. It held that appellees had no 
vested interest in the property of the decedents prior to their 
deaths and that Congress had plenary authority to abolish 
the power of testamentary disposition of Indian property and 
to alter the rules of intestate succession. App. to Juris. 
Statement 21a-26a. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 
Irving v. Clark, 758 F. 2d 1260 (1985). Although it agreed 
that the appellees had no vested rights in the decedents' 
property, it concluded that their decedents had a right, de-
rived from the original Sioux Allotment Statute, to control 
disposition of their property at death. The Court of Appeals 
held that the appellees had standing to invoke that right and 
that the taking of that right without compensation to dece-
dents' estates violated the Fifth Amendment. 1 
II 
The Court of Appeals concluded that appellees have stand-
ing to challenge §207. 758 F. 2d, at 1267-1268. The Gov-
ernment does not contest this ruling. As the Court of 
Appeals recognized, however, the existence of a case or con-
troversy is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's 
deliberations. I d., at 1267, n. 12. We are satisfied that the 
necessary case or controversy exists in this case. Section 
1 The Court of Appeals, without explanation, went on to "declare" that 
not only the original version of§ 207, but also the amended version not be-
fore it, 25 U.S. C. §2206 (1982 ed., Supp. III), unconstitutionally took 
property without compensation. Since none of the property which es-
cheated in this case did so pursuant to the amended version of the statute, 
this "declaration" is, at best, dicta. We express no opinion on the constitu-
tionality of§ 207 as amended. 
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207 has deprived appellees of the fractional interests they 
otherwise would have inherited. This is sufficient injury-in-
fact to satisfy Article III of the Constitution. See Singleton 
v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 112 (1976). 
In addition to the constitutional standing requirements, we 
have recognized prudential standing limitations. As the 
court below recognized, one of these prudential principles is 
that the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights 
and interests. 758 F. 2d, at 1267-1268. That general prin-
ciple, however, is subject to exceptions. Appellees here do 
not assert that their own property rights have been taken un-
constitutionally, but rather that their decedents' right to pass 
the property at death has been taken. Nevertheless, we 
have no difficulty in finding the concerns of the prudential 
standing doctrine met here. 
For obvious reasons, it has long been recognized that the 
surviving claims of a decedent must be pursued by a third 
party. At common law, a decedent's surviving claims were 
prosecuted by the executor or administrator of the estate. 
For Indians with trust property, statutes require the Secre-
tary of the Interior to assume that general role. 25 U. S. C. 
§§ 371-380. The Secretary's responsibilities in that capacity, 
however, include the administration of the statute that the 
appellees claim is unconstitutional, see 25 U. S. C. §§ 2202, 
2209, so that he can hardly be expected to assert appellees' 
decedents' rights to the extent that they turn on that point. 
Under these circumstances, appellees can appropriately 
serve as their decedents' representatives for purposes of 
asserting the latters' Fifth Amendment rights. They are 
situated to pursue the claims vigorously, since their interest 
in receiving the property is indissolubly linked to the dece-
dents' right to dispose of it by will or intestacy. A vindi-
cation of decedents' rights would ensure that the fractional 
interests pass to appellees; pressing these rights unsuccess-
fully would equally guarantee that appellees take nothing. 
In short, permitting appellees to raise their decedents' claims 
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is merely an extension of the common law's provision for ap-
pointment of a decedent's representative. It is therefore a 
"settled practice of the courts" not open to objection on the 
ground that it permits a litigant to raise third parties' rights. 
Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U. S. 405, 406 
(1900). 
III 
The Congress, acting pursuant to its broad authority to 
regulate the descent and devise of Indian trust lands, J effer-
son v. Fink, 247 U. S. 288, 294 (1918), enacted § 207 as a 
means of ameliorating, over time, the problem of extreme 
fractionation of certain Indian lands. By forbidding the 
passing on at death of small, undivided interests in Indian 
lands, Congress hoped that future generations of Indians 
would be able to make more productive use of the Indians' 
ancestral lands. We agree with the Government that en-
couraging the consolidation of Indian lands is a public pur-
pose of high order. The fractionation problem on Indian res-
ervations is extraordinary and may call for dramatic action 
to encourage consolidation. The Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux 
Tribe, appearing as amicus curiae in support of the United 
States, is a quintessential victim of fractionation. Forty 
acre tracts on the Sisseton-Wahpeton Lake Traverse res-
ervation, leasing for about $1,000 annually, are commonly 
subdivided into hundreds of undivided interests, many of 
which generate only pennies a year in rent. The average 
tract has 196 owners and the average owner undivided inter-
ests in fourteen tracts. The administrative headache this 
represents can be fathomed by examining Tract 1305, dubbed 
"one of the most fractionated parcels of land in the world." 
Lawson, Heirship: The Indian Amoeba, reprinted in Hearing 
on S. 2480 and S. 2663 before the Senate Select Committee 
on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 85 (1984). Tract 
1305 is forty acres and produces $1,080 in income annually. 
It is valued at $8,000. It has 439 owners, one-third of whom 
receive less than $.05 in annual rent and two-thirds of whom 
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receive less than $1. The largest interest holder receives 
$82.85 annually. The common denominator used to compute 
fractional interests in the property is 3,394,923,840,000. 
The smallest heir receives $.01 every 177 years. If the tract 
were sold (assuming the 439 owners could agree) for its esti-
mated $8,000 value, he would be entitled to $.000418. The 
administrative costs of handling this tract are estimated by 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs at $17,560 annually. !d., at 86, 
87. See also Comment, Too Little Land, Too Many Heirs-
The Indian Heirship Land Problem, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 709, 
711-713 (1971). 
This Court has held that the Government has considerable 
latitude in regulating property rights in ways that may ad-
versely affect the owners. See Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. --, ----- (1987); 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 
U. S. 104, 125-127 (1978); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 
590, 592-593 (1962). The framework for examining the ques-
tion of whether a regulation of property amounts to a taking 
requiring just compensation is firmly established and has 
been regularly and recently reaffirmed. See, e. g., Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, supra, at --; 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1004-1005 
(1984); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation 
Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 295 (1981); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 
U. S. 255, 260-261 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 
U.S. 164, 174-175 (1979); Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. New York City, supra, at 124. As THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
has written: 
"[T]his Court has generally 'been unable to develop any 
"set formula" for determining when "justice and fair-
ness" require that economic injuries caused by public ac-
tion be compensated by the government, rather than re-
main disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.' 
[Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 
438 U. S.], at 124. Rather, it has examined the 'taking' 
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question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual in-
quiries that have identified several factors-such as the 
economic impact of the regulation, its interference with 
reasonable investment backed expectations, and the 
character of the governmental action-that have particu-
lar significance. Ibid." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 
supra, at 175. 
There is no question that the relative economic impact of 
§ 207 upon the owners of these property rights can be sub-
stantial. Section 207 provides for the escheat of small un-
divided property interests that are unproductive during the 
year preceding the owner's death. Even if we accept the 
Government's assertion that the income generated by such 
parcels may be properly thought of as de minimis, their 
value may not be. While the Irving estate lost two interests 
whose value together was only approximately $100, the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs placed total values of approximately 
$2,700 and $1,816 on the escheatable interests in the Cross 
and Pumpkin Seed estates. See App. 20, 21-28, 29-39. 
These are not trivial sums. There are suggestions in the 
legislative history regarding the 1984 amendments to § 207 
that the failure to "look back" more than one year at the in-
come generated by the property had caused the escheat of 
potentially valuable timber and mineral interests. S. Rep. 
No. 98-632, p. 12 (1984); Hearing on H. J. Res. 158 before 
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Gong., 
2d Sess., 20, 26, 32, 75 (1984); Amendments to the Indian 
Land Consolidation Act: Hearing on H. J. Res. 158 before 
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Gong., 
1st Sess., 8, 29 (1983). Of course, the whole of appellees' de-
cedents' property interests were not taken by§ 207. Appel-
lees' decedents retained full beneficial use of the property 
during their lifetimes as well as the right to convey it inter 
vivos. There is no question, however, that the right to pass 
on valuable property to one's heirs is itself a valuable right. 
Depending on the age of the owner, much or most of the 
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value of the parcel may inhere in this "remainder" interest. 
See 26 CFR § 20.2031-7(0 (Table A) (1986) (value of remain-
der interest when life tenant is age 65 is approximately 32% 
of the whole). 
The extent to which any of the appellees had "investment-
backed expectations" in passing on the property is dubious. 
Though it is conceivable that some of these interests were 
purchased with the expectation that the owners might pass 
on the remainder to their heirs at death, the property 
has been held in trust for the Indians for 100 years and 
is overwhelmingly acquired by gift, descent, or devise. Be-
cause of the highly fractionated ownership, the property is 
generally held for lease rather than improved and used by the 
owners. None of the appellees here can point to any specific 
investment-backed expectations beyond the fact that their 
ancestors agreed to accept allotment only after ceding to 
the United States large parts of the original Great Sioux 
Reservation. 
Also weighing weakly in favor of the statute is the fact that 
there is something of an "average reciprocity of advantage," 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922), 
to the extent that owners of escheatable interests maintain a 
nexus to the Tribe. Consolidation of Indian lands in the 
Tribe benefits the members of the Tribe. All members do 
not own escheatable interests, nor do all owners belong to the 
Tribe. Nevertheless, there is substantial overlap between 
the two groups. The owners of escheatable interests often 
benefit from the escheat of others' fractional interests. 
Moreover, the whole benefit gained is greater than the sum 
of the burdens imposed since consolidated lands are more 
productive than fractionated lands. 
If we were to stop our analysis at this point, we might well 
find § 207 constitutional. But the character of the Govern-
ment regulation here is extraordinary. In Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U. S., at 176, we emphasized that the 
regulation destroyed "one of the most essential sticks in the 
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bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as prop-
erty-the right to exclude others." Similarly, the regulation 
here amounts to virtually the abrogation of the right to pass 
on a certain type of property-the small undivided interest-
to one's heirs. In one form or another, the right to pass 
on property-to one's family in particular-has been part of 
the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times. See 
United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 627-628 (1896). 
The fact that it may be possible for the owners of these in-
terests to effectively control disposition upon death through 
complex inter vivos transactions such as revocable trusts, is 
simply not an adequate supstitute for the rights taken given 
the nature of the property. Even the United States con-
cedes that total abrogation of the right to pass property is 
unprecedented and likely unconstitutional. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 12-14. Moreover, this statute effectively abolishes 
both descent and devise of these property interests even 
when the passing of the propE!rty to the heir might result 
in consolidation of property-as for instance when the heir 
already owns another undivided interest in the property. 2 
2 JUSTICE STEVENS argues that weighing in the balance the fact that 
§ 207 takes the right to pass property even when descent or devise results 
in consolidation of Indian lands amounts to an unprecedented importation 
of overbreadth analysis into our Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. Post, 
at --. The basis for this argument is his assertion that none of appel-
lees' decedents actually attempted to pass the property in a way that might 
have resulted in consolidation. But the fact of the matter remains that 
before § 207 was enacted appellees' decedents had the power to pass on 
their property at death to those who already owned an interest in the sub-
ject property. This right too was abrogated by § 207; each of the appel-
lees' decedents lost this stick in their bundles of property rights upon the 
enactment of § 207. It is entirely proper to note the extent of the rights 
taken from appellees' decedents in assessing whether the statute passes 
constitutional muster under the Penn Central balancing test. This is nei-
ther overbreadth analysis nor novel. See, e. g., Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. --, -- (1987); (discussing, in 
general terms, the extent of the abrogation of coal extraction rights caused 
by the Subsidence Act); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
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Compare 25 U. S. C. § 2206(b) (1982 ed., Supp. Ill). Since 
the escheatable interests are not, as the United States ar-
gues, necessarily de minimis, nor, as it also argues, does the 
availability of inter vivos transfer obviate the need for de-
scent and devise, a total abrogation of these rights cannot be 
upheld. But cf. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51 (1979) (up-I 
holding abrogation of the right to sell endangered eagles' 
parts as necessary to environmental protection regulatory 
0 
~ 
1 5 ~ 1 b I\) 
scheme). ;::.-
In holding that complete abolition of both the descent and 
devise of a particular class of property may be a taking, we 
reaffirm the continuing vitality of the long line of cases 
recognizing the States', and where appropriate, the United 
States', broad authority to adjust the rules governing the 
descent and devise of property without implicating the guar-
antees of the Just Compensation Clause. See, e. g., Irving 
Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U. S. 556, 562 (1942); Jefferson v. 
Fink, 247 U. S., at 294. The difference in this case is the 
fact that both descent and devise are completely abolished; 
indeed they are abolished even in circumstances when the 
governmental purpose sought to be advanced, consolidation 
of ownership of Indian lands, does not conflict with the fur-
ther descent of the property. 
There is little doubt that the extreme fractionation of 
Indian lands is a serious public problem. It may well be 
appropriate for the United States to ameliorate fractionation 
City, 438 U. S. 104, 136-137 (1978) (discussing extent to which air rights 
abrogated by the designation of Grand Central Station as a landmark, not-
ing that not all new construction prohibited, and noting the availability of 
transferable development rights). 
JUSTICE STEVENS' objections are perhaps better directed at the question 
of whether there is third-party standing to challenge this statute under the 
Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause. But as we have shown, 
there is certainly no Article III bar to permitting the appellees to raise 
their decedents claims, supra, at -, and JusTICE STEVENS himself con-
cedes that prudential considerations do not bar consideration of the Fifth 
Amendment claim. Post, at -. 
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by means of regulating the descent and devise of Indian 
lands. Surely it is permissible for the United States to pre-
· vent the owners of such interests from further subdividing 
them among future heirs on pain of escheat. See Texaco, 
Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516, 542 (1982) (BRENNAN, J., dis-
senting). It may be appropriate to minimize further com-
pounding of the problem by abolishing the descent of such in-
terests by rules of intestacy, thereby forcing the owners to 
formally designate an heir to prevent escheat to the Tribe. 
What is certainly not appropriate is to take the extraordinary 
step of abolishing both descent and devise of these property 
interests even when the passing of the property to the heir 
might result in consolidation of property. Accordingly, we 
find that this regulation, in the words of Justice Holmes, 
"goes too far." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U. S., at 415. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
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